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Abstract
Fairness emerges as a relevant factor in redistributive preferences in
surveys and experiments. We study experimentally the impact of vary-
ing the probability with which players are assigned to initial positions
in Ultimatum Games (UGs). In the baseline case players have equal
opportunities of being assigned the proposer position arguably the
more advantaged one in UGs. Chances become increasingly unequal
across three treatments. We also manipulate the inter-temporal allo-
cation of opportunities over rounds. We nd that: (1) The more initial
chances are distributed unequally, the lower the acceptance rates of a
given o¤er; consequently, o¤ers increase; (2) Being assigned a mere 1%
chance of occupying the proposer role compared to none, signicantly
increases acceptance rates and decreases o¤ers; (3) Players accept even
extreme amounts of unequal chances within each round in exchange
for overall equality of opportunities across rounds. Procedural fairness
both static and dynamic - has clear relevance for individuals.
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1 Introduction
"[...]All are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue
their full measure of happiness.(from Barack Obamas swearing-
in speech after the 2008 US elections).
There is a symbolic utility to us of certainty itself. The di¤erence
between probability .9 and 1.0 is greater than between .8 and .9,
though this di¤erence between di¤erences disappears when each is
embedded in larger otherwise identical probabilistic gamblesthis
disappearance marks the di¤erence as symbolic. (Nozick 1994,
p. 34).
The idea that initial positions have to be assigned equitably in the com-
petition for scarce resources is one of the cornerstones of systems of distribu-
tive justice in contemporary societies. It is functional to guaranteeing equal
opportunities to citizens in the pursuit of their goals, along with the require-
ment that the rules of the competition confer no advantage to participants
(Diamond, 1967; Rawls, 1999; Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Roemer, 1998).
In practice, large amounts of resources are spent to level the playing eld
in many developed countries. A clear example is public spending on primary
and secondary education 1. Fairness in the allocation of initial positions also
bears on preferences for redistribution. Corneo and Gruner (2002) nd that
people believing that coming from a wealthy family is important for get-
ting ahead in life are also more supportive of income redistribution. Their
sample includes 12 countries from both Western economies and ex-socialist
countries, so this view seems widespread. This evidence may be construed
as proof that people perceiving initial positions as unfairly distributed also
see the nal income allocation as unfair and thus demand more income re-
distribution2. Since US citizens generally believe that their society grants
more opportunities for climbing the economic ladder than their European
counterparts (Gilens, 1999), fairness considerations have been deemed to be
1According to OECD data (2002), governments in OECD countries allocate substantial
public spending to primary and secondary education, the average being 3.5% of GDP
in 1999. Interestingly, US expenditures are in line with the OECD average and with
continental European countries, whilst they di¤er markedly with respect to other public
expenditure provisions (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). This can be interpreted as a general
expression of political support for policies equalizing initial positions. See also Lipset
(1997).
2Other factors a¤ecting the fairness of the competition for nal positions have also been
shown to be relevant. For instance, both Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
show that US citizens believing that hard work and e¤ort are important for getting ahead
in life are less supportive of income redistribution.
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at the root of the much lower redistribution taking place in the US vis-à-vis
Europe (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2006).
In spite of the widespread support for the level playing eldidea, many
people nonetheless judge their society to fall short of this principle. 77%
of the participants in the 2006 International Social Survey Programme re-
sponded that the government should spend "more" or "much more" on ed-
ucation - even if that implied increased taxation - in a sample including 33
countries. Education comes second after health as the item for which re-
spondents want most to increase public spending, ahead of pensions, law
enforcement, the environment, unemployment benets, culture and arts, and
defence3.
A rst basic requirement of equality of opportunities is formal in that
nobody should be prevented from entering a competition for nal positions,
o¢ ces, or powers, and everyone should be judged on the merits relevant for
that position. However, many societies fall short of this objective. This is
the case when people are discriminated against for their belonging to as-
criptively dened social groups, such as apartheid systems, or the caste sys-
tem in India4. A stronger requirement has been put forward that societies
should provide not only formal but also substantial equality of opportunities.
That is the notion that all citizens should be materially put in the condition
to compete for positions regardless of circumstances for which they cannot
be held responsible, such as their social background or genetic endowment
(Williams, 1962; Rawls, 1999). However, most societies fall short of this ideal
by a greater or smaller margin (see e.g. Bowles et al., 2008). This may be put
down to either the conceptual di¢ culty in providing a sound notion of oppor-
tunity (Fleurbaey, 1995; Dworkin, 2000: 87), or to the practical di¢ culties
associated with its implementation (see Romer, 1998, for a method in this
respect, and Fleurbaey, 2002, for a critic). However, in other cases lack of
political willpower may be to blame, especially as this objective may conict
with societys other objectives, for instance e¢ ciency (Roemer, 1998).
Not only is luck relevant to the assignment of social and economic groups,
but also it plays a role in several other dimensions of ones career. For in-
stance, job selection procedures may involve some degrees of discretionality
by the selectors, so the outcome of the selection may partly depend on the
3Even in the US, the country traditionally seen as the "land of opportunity", 29% of
respondents to the 1998 Gallup Social Audit declared that "all Americans do not have an
equal opportunity to succeed" (Gallup, 1999). Corneo and Fong (2008) nd this measure
of availability of opportunity to be a strong (negative) predictor of individual preferences
for redistribution.
4As recently as 2006, Indias prime minister Mr Manmohan Singh likened discrim-
ination against the "untouchables" in India to an apartheid system. See report in
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/28/india.mainsection. See also Deshpande
(2011) and Ho¤ and Pandey (2006).
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luck that a person has in meeting the selectorsfavour. Such arbitrary ele-
ments in judgements may be di¢ cult to eliminate completely.
It is thus undoubtedly important for economic policy to understand how
deviations from the ideal of a fully level playing eld or a fully unbiased
judgement are perceived by individuals. How negative is individualseval-
uation of the lack of equal opportunities, and how more negative does it
become as we move farther away from the ideal? What value do individuals
attach to a purely symbolic opportunity, such as one attributing one very
small chance of gaining an advantaged position, in comparison to a situa-
tion of absolute discrimination? Do equal opportunities need to be granted
at any instance of social interaction? Or are people happy to accept equal
opportunities on average across time, for instance being advantaged half the
time and disadvantaged the other half?
The empirical investigation on the topic su¤ers from its almost exclusive
reliance on survey questions where, by necessity, the notion of opportunity is
often vague and prone to subjective interpretation. In this paper we seek to
shed some light on these issues adopting an experimental approach. Experi-
ments have the advantage of allowing the researcher to manipulate the degree
of fairness in assigning initial positions, and to measure rigorously individu-
alsreactions to deviations from the benchmark situation of perfect fairness.
Many experiments have already dealt with the issue of procedural fairness
showing its relevance to individuals (see section 2). We are, to the best of
our knowledge, the rst to tackle the issue of fairness in the assignment of
initial positions proper.
We take the Ultimatum Game (UG henceforth) as our basic interaction.
This game has been used extensively to examine individualsassessment of
the fairness of a payo¤ allocation involving two players. For the purpose of
our investigation what matters is that interaction in the UG takes place from
asymmetric positions. The proposer in a UG has a rst-mover advantage
over the responder in that she can dictate the shares of the nal allocations.
This position of advantage is normally conducive to a larger share of the
payo¤s accruing to proposers, who on average obtain more than 60% of the
pie (see e.g. Oosterbeek et al., 2004). Guth and Tiez (1986) show that when
subjects are asked to bid on the two positions of a UG before bargaining,
they o¤er twice as much to occupy the proposers role than the receivers role.
Arguably, the proposers position is more desirable than the responders.
The main novelty of our experimental design is to make the access to
the two UG roles subject to a lottery, and to manipulate the distribution
of probability of these lotteries. The baseline case is that both players have
equal opportunities, as the lottery assigns both individuals a 50% chance of
acquiring the proposer role. In the other treatments, the initial lottery is
biased in favour of one of the two players. We consider three treatments in
4
which one of the two players is favoured with respect to the other in that she
has, respectively, 80%, 99%, and 100% probability of becoming the proposer,
while the unfavoured player only has the residual probability. In this way
we are able to assess the impact of increasing disparity in the distribution
of initial chances on individual perception of allocation fairness. We also
study another dimension of procedural fairness, relative to the distribution
of opportunities over time. In what we call the xed role condition (FRC),
an unfavoured player remains disadvantaged throughout the 20 interactions
of the experiment. Under the variable role condition (VRC), positions are
reassigned before each round. We claim that VRC provides for equality of
opportunity in a dynamic rather than in a static sense. We believe our
study to be the rst to tackle the issue of the inter-temporal distribution of
opportunities.
It is worth noting that the initial lottery represents a purely proce-
dural addition to the bargaining stage that brings about no strategic con-
sequences. Individuals who are consequentialist (Machina, 1989; Hammond,
1988) should regard such initial stage as irrelevant. Self-interested people
should therefore attach no value to them. People having other-regarding
consequentialist preferences, as those modelled in Fehr and Schmidts (1999)
(FS henceforth) and Bolton and Ockenfelss (2000) (BO henceforth) theories,
should nd such an initial stage irrelevant, too. The same holds for theories of
intention-based reciprocity, and theories emphasizing concerns for e¢ ciency
(Charness and Rabin, 2002). The fairness of the initial lottery should in-
stead be relevant for procedural individuals. Models of procedural fairness
have been put forward (Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels, 2005 - BBO hence-
forth; Trautmann, 2009), where preferences are dened over the procedures
bringing about outcomes, rather than on mere outcomes. However, these
models are dened over lotteries that directly determine nal outcomes, so
they remain silent on procedures determining the initial positions of an in-
teraction. Section 8 shows how a simple modication of the FS model can
account for most of our ndings.
We illustrate the main hypotheses and the experimental protocol in sec-
tions 2 and 3. In sections 4 and 5 we show the results for FRCTs and
the VRCTs, respectively. Section 6 focuses on the rst round of interactions
while 7 contrasts FRC with VRC and analyses the dynamic evolution of play.
Section 8 presents our theoretical model. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Review of the literature
The UG is an allocation problem among two players. The rst-mover (the
proposer) makes an o¤er to the second-mover (the receiver) about how to
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divide a given pie. The receiver can then accept the o¤er, in which case
both players receive what dictated by the proposal, or reject it, in which case
neither receives anything. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)
of this simple interaction is the most unequal allocation possible: the pro-
poser should demand all but the smallest possible amount the pie, and the
receiver should accept this o¤er. It is well-known that experimental evidence
consistently and conspicuously deviates from this prediction (Oosterbeek et
al., 2004).
Several experiments have varied the way initial positions are assigned in
UGs - or in Dictator Games (DGs) 5. A rst class of experiments conditions
role assignment to a contest, based e.g. on general knowledge quizzes, ability
tests, or simple tasks. In the pioneering study by Ho¤man et al. (1994),
best-ranked (worst-ranked) players were assigned the proposer (receiver) role.
This resulted in proposers demanding signicantly more for themselves, and
UG receivers being willing to accept such higher claims. This result has
been construed in terms of the enhanced legitimacy that being assigned to
the advantaged position has when this has been "earned" in a fair contest.
Hence the proposers entitlement to a larger share. A similar impact of
earning ones initial endowment has been conrmed in several other studies6.
A second class of experiments makes playersinitial endowments unequal.
In Armantier (2006) either proposers or receivers were assigned a larger en-
dowment than their counterparts. In the initial rounds of interactions, sub-
jects tried to compensate for this imbalance, with proposers (receivers) hav-
ing larger endowments o¤ering more (accepting more) in comparison with
the baseline case of endowment equality7. A similar willingness to compen-
sate arbitrary di¤erences in initial endowments has been found in Becker and
Miller (2009). Guth and Tietz (1986) let players alter their initial endow-
ments through their own choice when participating in an auction to determine
their roles. Proposers paid on average twice as much as receivers to acquire
their role. In the subsequent bargaining phase, the mode of the distribution
shifted away from the 50-50 split, and moved closer to a 2/3-1/3 split. This
5A Dictator Game is the same as a UG apart from the removal of the receivers action
space. In other words, the receiver of a DG is a passive player who takes home all of what
the dictator has left to her. This interaction was rst studied by Forsythe et al. (1994)
to tease out whether proposers behaviour in UGs was due to fairness or self-interested
calculation. The fact that o¤ers still remain positive in DGs but are lower than in UGs is
evidence that both motivations are present in individualsdecision-making.
6See e.g. Konow (2000), Cherry et al. (2002), Esarey et al. (2006), Cappelen et al.
(2007), Durante and Putterman (2008), Schurter and Wilson (2009), for (modied versions
of) dictator games.
7This trend was however reversed in the nal rounds of the game. It has been conjec-
tured that this may be due to something alike a "moral credit": Players tend to be more
pro-social in initial rounds than in nal ones.
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means that, taking into account the initial costs sustained in the auction,
the resulting payo¤ distribution came close to a 50-50 split. The lesson from
these experiments seems to be that players perceive the disparity in their
initial endowment as arbitrary, and act in ways to compensate it.
In a third class of games, it is the nal outside options which are mod-
ied. Buchan et al. (2006) compare a standard UG with a "buyer power"
condition where the proposer has a greater-than-zero outside option in case
of rejection by the receiver. They nd that such treatment condition has
opposite results in the US - where receivers lower, albeit slightly, their accep-
tance thresholds - and Japan - where receivers signicantly increase theirs.
Binmore et al. (1991) study repeated UGs where a player has a much larger
outside option than the other player. They nd that the exploitation of
such "power" is not universal but is limited to specic bargaining schemes.
Similarly, Suleiman (1996) and Handgraaf et al. (2008) consider UGs where
receivers have varying powers to modify the pairs payo¤s after rejecting the
proposal. A rejection by the receiver entails that only a percentage (1  ) of
the pie is destroyed, while a percentage  is preserved. So, receiverss power
is maximal (minimal) when  = 0 ( = 1);which corresponds to a standard
UG (DG). Both studies consider treatments where  is set at values in the
interior of the interval as well as at the two extremes. Suleiman (1996) nds,
as expected, an overall negative relationship between receiverspower and
proposerso¤ers. No rm inference on receiversbehaviour can be drawn
due to the paucity of low o¤ers in some of the treatments. Handgraaf et
al. (2008) nd a signicant variation in proposersbehaviour triggered by a
10% change in : Moreover, when given the possibility to choose how much
power they want to have, receivers show a strong preference to have more
power than less. It is worth noting that both studies nd signicant e¤ects
for relatively small variations of their manipulation parameter , and some
reversal in the otherwise monotonic trends linking  to playersbehaviour.
We nd similar instances of both e¤ects in our setting, too.
All of these studies nd relevant e¤ects on nal payo¤s of modifying the
way initial positions, initial endowments, or nal outside options, are as-
signed. This is remarkable because the strategic nature of the bargaining
problem is left unaltered by such modications - namely, the SPNE remains
the same as in the standard UG (or DG). Equity theory (Homans, 1958;
Walster et al., 1978) - the idea that allocations should be distributed in pro-
portion to ones relative e¤ort, abilities, or investment, compared to others
- has been called upon to account for some of these results. In contexts
where proposers earntheir position of advantage, their increased demand is
legitimate. In cases where greater power is arbitrarily assigned, a substantial
portion of players try to compensate for such imbalance, sometimes at the
cost of destroying the whole pie.
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All the studies reviewed above more or less explicitly a¤ect the fairness
of the game procedures, either introducing a competition for initial positions
(rst class of games) or by modifying the games material aspect, that is, ini-
tial endowments, and outside options (second and third class). Only recently
has the focus been extended to studying the impact of unequal opportunities
to achieve monetary payo¤s, rather than inequality in the payo¤s them-
selves. BBO show that individuals are indeed sensitive to the way chances
are distributed in a social interaction. They contrast a treatment where UG
proposers can choose between an equal share of the pie and an unequal al-
location, to a treatment in which proposers can choose between an unbiased
lottery - giving equal chances to win the whole pie - and the same unequal
allocation as in the previous treatment. They notice that respondersbehav-
iour when o¤ered the unequal allocation is virtually the same in these two
scenarios. Thus they conclude that procedural fairness is a substitute for out-
come fairness. This result has been replicated in several other experiments
using modied DGs, although it appears that equality of opportunity is not
a full substitute for equality of outcomes (Karni et al., 2008; Becker and
Miller, 2009; Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010). In a second study, BBO report
how rejection rates in a modied UG with random computer-generated pro-
posals is signicantly higher when the lottery is strongly biased in favour of
the proposer than when it is unbiased. Hence, they conclude that receivers
seem to dislike situations where they had signicantly fewer chances than
proposers, even when the nal outcome is the same.
Other studies use modied versions of DGs to investigate how variations
in initial opportunities a¤ect redistributive choices. In Krawczyk (2010),
participants are matched in groups of four, and are assigned di¤erent prob-
abilities of winning (PoW) monetary prizes. After being informed of their
own and othersPoW, players are asked to propose a tax rate which will be
applied to the individualsearnings. This acts as a redistributive scheme,
which ranges from the two extremes of either leaving the prize assignment
unchanged (in case of a 0% tax rate), or bringing about equal nal allocations
(if a 100% tax rate is selected). Each player has an even probability of having
her proposed tax rate selected. PoWs are manipulated so that each player
makes decisions in groups with either a high or a low dispersion of PoW.
The theoretical prediction is that procedural players should react to higher
dispersion in PoW by increasing their proposed tax rates. However, this is
not the case. Demanded tax rates do not react to changes in the dispersion
of PoWs. The only aspect in which procedures seems to matter lies in the
fact that players react to the varying dispersion in PoW more in the "merit"
treatment - where incomes are determined by the relative performance in a
contest - relative to the "luck" treatment - where incomes are determined
randomly.
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Cappelen et al. (2010) also study the impact of varying initial positions,
where these are determined by individual choice rather than luck. In an initial
stage players choose between participating in a lottery and opting for a safe
alternative payment. Players are then matched in twos and asked to put
forward a tax rate to be applied to their pair. This has an even probability
of being selected. Even in this setting players have an even chance of acting
as "dictators" for their pair. The important aspect for our investigation
is that players are faced with di¤ering values of the safe alternative to the
lottery. A player having a small safe alternative may be thought of as having
fewer opportunities than a player having a high safe option. However, even
in this case, such a manipulation of initial opportunity does not bring about
the expected results: Players do not in fact react to the variation in their
respective initial opportunities.
The results coming from these two papers seemingly imply that distrib-
ution of initial opportunity does not matter much to people - at least in an
experimental context - whereas considerations of merit (in Krawczyks (2010)
paper), or the actual choice of how much risk one wants to take (in Cappelen
et als (2010) paper) are much more relevant for "pro-social" individuals.
We believe, though, that the negative result emerging from these two papers
may be due to the choice of a within-subject design, which may dilute the
di¤erences across conditions. It is also possible that the information over ini-
tial opportunities was not salient enough to subjects, partly because of the
existence of other experimental manipulations, partly because the parameter
range variation was not extreme.
In order to eliminate these possible causes of concern and magnify the
di¤erences across decisions, we revert to a between-subject approach, and
we consider extreme values in the possible dispersion in initial opportunities.
In fact, our baseline case consists of players having even chances, whereas
at the other extreme a treatment assigns all chances to one player and no
chances to the other. Alike Suleiman (1996) and Handgraaf et al. (2008), we
manipulate fairness parameters from the extremes to the interior of the rele-
vant interval in order to examine in detail the impact of fairness variations.
Similarly to BBO we use receiversrejection rates of a given o¤er as a way
to measure the degree to which a certain procedure is deemed as unfair. The
existing models of procedural fairness predict that changes in initial chances
should make no di¤erence to playersbehaviour. The reason is that they
only consider procedures falling within the playersstrategy sets, or a¤ecting
nal outcomes. On the contrary, our conjecture is that individuals may be
sensitive to the distribution of relative chances even when these determine
initial positions.
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3 Experimental design and hypotheses
The game tree of the stage game is displayed in Figure 1. 10 GBP are
at stake in every round. Two players, named Player 1 and Player 2, are
matched to play an extended version of a UG. Players simultaneously make
a proposal, which is a division of the pie, to their counterpart. Formally,
a proposal by player i is a division (xi; 10   xi) where xi is the amount
player i demands for herself and 10   xi is the residual being o¤ered to her
counterpart, i 2 f1; 2g. Players do not know the counterparts proposal.
After the proposals x1and x2 have been submitted, one of the two is selected
at random. The key aspect of the design is that treatments di¤er according to
the probability with which proposal 2 (1) is randomly selected. This is given
by the probability p (1   p). Such probability has a maximum (minimum)
of p = 0:5 for Player 2 (1   p = 0:5 for Player 1) in the 50% treatment,
it goes down (up) to p = 0:2 (1   p = 0:8) in the 20% treatment, it goes
further down (up) to p = 0:01 (1 p = 0:99) in the 1% treatment, and nally
reaches a minimum of p = 0 (1   p = 1) in the 0% treatment. In the 0%
treatment we dispense Player 2 from submitting a proposal, as this would
have no possibility of being selected. Both Suleiman (1996) and Handgraaf
et al. (1998) follow a similar strategy in not asking players to perform an
action when this has a 0% probability of being relevant to the game.
At the top node of the decision tree, people are informed of whether they
are Player 1 or 2, so they know from the outset whether they are favoured
or not. For this reason we have also named Player 1 and Player 2 "(1
p)-player" and "p-player", respectively. After Nature makes the draw and
selects the proposal, the interaction is exactly like a standard UG. Suppose
it is is proposal that is selected. Then player i becomes the proposer of the
UG in the bottom part of the game tree, and player j becomes the receiver.
Player i is informed that her o¤er has been selected, but does not receive any
information about js o¤er. Conversely, xi is communicated to player j, who
has to either accept or reject the proposal. Should player j accept, payo¤s
are xi and 1 xi for player i and player j respectively. Should player j reject,
both playerspayo¤ is 0. All random draws were made by the computer.
Apart from the 50% baseline case where opportunities to become the
proposer are even, in the other three treatments Player 1 always has higher
opportunities to be selected as the proposer of the game. We thus refer to
Player 1 (2) as the favoured (unfavoured) player. Note that for a conse-
quentialist agent all treatments are strategy equivalent. The NE for rational
payo¤-maximisers is, as in standard UGs, the proposer obtaining the highest
possible allocation consistent with making the responder willing to accept and
the responder obtaining the residual. That is, the only SPNE is (10  "; ")8,
8Since players were allowed to make o¤ers up to the second decimal digit, " = 0:01 in
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for all p.
Subjects played the game described above anonymously for 20 rounds
with random re-matching at the beginning of each round. Payo¤s were given
by the outcomes of two randomly-selected rounds out of the 20: Random pay-
ments were done partly to limit income e¤ects as the play went on, partly to
minimise the protability of dynamic strategic behaviour such as rejecting
with higher frequency in the early stages of the game to induce counterparts
to o¤er more at later stages. We preferred to pay subjects for two rounds in-
stead of just one because we feared that a payment based on only one round,
coupled with the relatively low show-up fee (5 GBP), may have discouraged
receivers from rejecting unfair proposals. After each round each pair was
informed of the outcome of the interaction. No information about the out-
come of the other pairsinteractions was instead released. The experiment
instructions are reported at the end of the paper.
We want to test the following hypotheses. First, a reasonable assump-
tion, in line with BBOs nding and the survey results reported in 1, is that
the higher the fairness of the initial lottery - i.e. the less unbiased the distri-
bution of initial chances, the more acceptable a certain earnings allocation.
We thus posit our rst hypothesis, which we call the Monotonic Fairness
Hypothesis:
H1a: The more biased the initial lottery, the lower respondersaccep-
tance rate.
If proposers correctly anticipate this behaviour, then we can also posit
that:
H1b: The more biased the initial lottery, the lower proposersdemands.
Whilst BBO compare only two extremely di¤erent lotteries in their sec-
ond study, our setting enables us to study a ner range of distribution of
chances within lotteries. We are particularly interested in testing for Noz-
icks prediction that individuals are highly sensitive to the symbolic value
of actions. Nozick argues that individuals attach value to the possibility of
expressing their own individuality through actions, where this power of ex-
pression magnies the utility intrinsic to the action. As Nozick (1994: 27.28)
puts it: Having a symbolic meaning, the actions are treated as having the
utility of what they symbolically mean [...] Since symbolic actions often are
expressive actions, another view of them would be this: the symbolic connec-
tion of an action to a situation enables the action to be expressive of some
attitude, belief, value, emotions or whatever. Expressiveness not utility is
our experiments.
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what ows back.Furthermore, Nozicks citation reported in the introduc-
tion implies that the individuals value metric over the probability space may
not be linear, and may su¤er "discontinuities" in the origin of the space, i.e.
when we move from full certainty to even limited uncertainty. Accordingly,
our conjecture is that the act of making a proposal with a sheer 1% chance
of it being relevant, may symbolize, for the unfavoured player, expressive
value independently of the intrinsic expected utility coming from having this
option. This power of "voice" (Anand, 1991; see also discussion in section
9) may give the individual what Nozick calls an "expressiveness", that is, a
source of "value" that goes beyond the mere utility associated with the act
itself.
If this were true, we should expect a signicant di¤erence in behaviour
between the treatment where a player has a mere 1% chance of acquiring the
proposers role to that in which she has no chance. We thus posit what we
call the "Symbolic Opportunity Hypothesis":
H2a: Respondersacceptance rate decreases signicantly in the 0% treat-
ment in comparison to the 1% treatment.
H2b: Proposers demand signicantly less in the 0% treatment in compar-
ison to the 1% treatment.
Hence, the second hypotheses is consistent with the rst hypothesis,
claiming that even allowing a purely symbolic chance of acquiring the ad-
vantaged position in the UG has a signicant e¤ect in changing the fairness
judgement of the resulting allocations.
We are also interested in testing for the impact of varying the allocation of
opportunities over time. As mentioned in the introduction, the FRC setting
entails a relevant procedural change vis-à-vis the VRC setting in that in FRC
a player keeps the same role as either favoured or unfavoured throughout the
whole 20 rounds. This is determined prior to all interactions taking place.
Conversely, in VRC treatments playerspositions are reassigned before each
round. In both cases players are informed of the way roles are assigned
prior to the beginning of the interactions. So, a player being assigned the
unfavoured role in a FRC setting can see her fate as being sealed throughout
the whole 20 rounds, whereas in the VRC setting a player who is unfavoured
in the current round knows that she may be assigned the favoured role in each
of the future rounds. Arguably, FRCTs are less fair from the procedural point
of view than VRC treatments, because there is no possibility of reversing
the initial role assignment9. Consistently with the above considerations, we
9One may object that opportunities are fairly distributed in FRC treatments because
before the initial role assignment each player had an even chance of being assigned the
advantaged position. Nevertheless, we believe that this observation does not actually a¤ect
12
expect that procedural individuals will be sensitive to this di¤erence, and
will nd the same allocation more acceptable when this has been generated
within an overall fairer setting rather than a less fair one. We thus posit our
third set of hypotheses, which we call "Dynamic Opportunities Hypothesis":
H3a: Receiversacceptance rate decreases signicantly in the FRC setting
vis-à-vis the VRC setting.
H3b: Proposers demand less in the FRC setting vis-à-vis the VRC setting.
Finally, our setting also enables us to test the presence of learning, i.e.
convergence, or nearing, the SPNE of the game. In spite of the initial nega-
tive results in Slonim and Roth (1996), subsequent studies have found some
evidence that players behaviours in repeated UGs tend to converge to the
SPNE (List and Cherry, 2000; Armantier, 2006). We then test whether:
H4a: Receiversacceptance rate increases over time.
H3b: Proposers demand more over time.
Experiments were conducted with a sample of 426 Warwick University
undergraduate students, with an average of 60 students per treatment. Only
subjects who had not been attending courses in Game Theory were allowed
to participate. We ran three sessions per treatment. Due to varying show-up
rates, the number of subjects per session was not constant across sessions
but varied from a minimum of 16 to a maximum of 24 subjects, with an
average of around 20 subjects per session. The analysis we present in the
next sections is however robust to controlling for the number of subjects
participating in each session. Each subject only participated in one session.
We took care to balance the composition of the sessions in terms of gender
and number of people enrolled in Economics and Psychology courses with
respect to the total. Each session was organised according to the following
procedures. Subjects were paid a show-up fee of 5 GBP upon their entering
the experimental room, and were randomly assigned to a computer in the
room. After instructions were administered, written comprehension quizzes
were carried out. Subjects were asked to re-try answering the quizzes until
they gave the correct answer. Subjects were then involved in the 20 inter-
actions of the stage game. At the end of the decisions subjects completed
a short questionnaire asking demographic and attitudinal questions, and -
nally received their payo¤s. The whole session lasted around an hour. The
average earnings - in addition to the show-up fee - was GBP8.22 . The game
was conducted using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 1999).
our statement. Because in FRC the outcome of the initial - and only - role assignment
is extremely unequal - one player is favoured (unfavoured) for all 20 rounds. Conversely,
in VRC treatments the outcome of the 20 di¤erent role assignments is undoubtedly less
unequal, as the probability that a player ends up as favoured a certain number of times
is given by a binomial distribution with parameters (20; 1=2):The most likely outcome is
thus that each player is assigned the favoured role half of the times.
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4 Results for FRCTs
In the following two sections we analyse the baseline 50% treatment in con-
junction with FRCTs.
4.1 Analysis of ReceiversBehavior in FRC
4.1.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the relevant features of proposers
and responders behaviour in each treatment. First, we note that overall
acceptance rate in our 0%_FRC treatment is in line with what found in
standard UGs, though at somewhat lower levels. In the meta-analysis by
Oosterbeek et al. (2004), the weighted average acceptance rate from 66 UG
studies is 84:25%, whereas it equals 77:58% in our study. Our 0%_FRC is
the treatment in our experiment that is closest to standard UGs, so we have
some assurance that the behavioural patterns we observe in our study are not
due to specic idiosyncrasies of our sample. Comparing the 50% treatment
(Table 1a) and the FRCTs (Tables1 b, c, d) brings out the existence of a
monotonic pattern consistent with H1 and H2. First, as the bias of the initial
lottery increases, both the mean and the median values of rejected demands
decreases (see Tables 1a-d, Columns 1). This means that as the initial lottery
becomes more biased, responders request larger shares of the pie to accept
the o¤er.
Second, the acceptance rates of low o¤ers decreases as the bias of the
initial lottery increases (see Tables 1a-d, Columns 3). The acceptance rate
for a treatment is the proportion of o¤ers that were accepted over the total
number of o¤ers that were made. We consider a demand as "high" when the
proposer demanded at least 80% of the pie for herself, thus leaving a share
equal to or less than 20% to the responder. This is a somewhat arbitrary
value but it is often taken as a reference point in the UG literature. It is worth
noting that the drop in the acceptance rate for high demands is particularly
pronounced between FRC 1% and FRC 0%, consistently with H2a. This
monotonic pattern does not emerge in overall acceptance rate, but this is
because the magnitudes of proposals varied considerably across treatments
(see Tables 1a-d, Columns 2). The econometric analysis of the next section
controls for this aspect.
Finally, Figure 2 o¤ers a graphical representation of responders and pro-
posersbehavior in each treatment by reporting histograms of proposals as
well as acceptance rates for di¤erent classes of proposals. Here proposals
have been grouped in intervals of length equal to 0.5 for all demands greater
than ve, whereas all demands smaller than ve have been grouped in one
14
category. It is evident that acceptance rates tend to decrease within each
class as the initial lottery becomes more biased.
4.1.2 Econometric Analysis
We pool all observations coming from FRCTs and the 50% treatment to-
gether. We model the repeated nature of the data with a random-e¤ects
model. Given the dichotomic nature of the receivers variable, we t the
following logit models:
ACCEPTANCEi;t = i + CHANCE + i;tOFFER + (1)
+i;tFAV OURED + tROUNDt + iZi + ui + "i;t
ACCEPTANCEi;t = i + jTREATMENTj + i;tOFFER + (2)
+i;tFAV OURED + tROUNDt + iZi + ui + "i;t
The dependent variable is the dichotomic variable ACCEPTANCE -
where 1 (0) denotes acceptance (rejection) of a given proposal. In model 1
the key variable to test for H1a is CHANCE. This variable takes the value of
p, that is, the probability for an unfavoured player to become the proposer.
Hence, CHANCE o¤ers a continuous measure of the bias in the initial lot-
tery. Furthermore, we control for the size of the o¤er assigned to the receiver
through the variable OFFER. The probability of acceptance is likely to be
highly correlated with the size of the o¤er, which in turn may vary consider-
ably across treatments (see next section). The dummy variable FAVOURED
identies the interactions where a subject being in the favoured role was
later drawn as receiver of the game. Obviously this only applies to the 1%
and the 20% treatments. It may be the case that subjects initially drawn
as favoured formed higher earnings expectations for that particular round
than if they were drawn as unfavoured. Or maybe fairness concerns due
to their awareness of being overall more likely to occupy the proposer role
made them more lenient to accept o¤ers when occupying the receiver role.
Having a higher initial reference pointin terms of expected earnings may
a¤ect the likelihood with which they subsequently accepted o¤ers. Zi is a
set of individual characteristics that may a¤ect propensity to accept. Zi in-
cludes a subjects age and gender, and two dummy variables identifying UK
citizenship and enrolment in economic degrees. Introducing Zi considerably
reduces the number of observations due to missing questionnaire answers, so
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we shall report regression results with and without Zi: ROUND dummies
are also included to control for time trend e¤ects of e¤ects associated with
specic rounds. Finally, ui and "i;t are individual-specic and observation-
specic error terms. The indexes i and t denote the individual and the round
of the interaction, respectively. Hence, i = 1 : : : N; and t = 1 : : : 20. Note
that all regressors apart from the dummy variable identifying attendance of
economic degree are exogenous. Hence, in regressions not including Zi the
individual-specic e¤ects i must be uncorrelated with the other regressors,
thus ensuring that a between estimator is consistent.
Model (2) keeps the same specication as (1) apart from replacingCHANCE
with dummy variables identifying individual treatments. We introduce three
dummy variables identifying each treatment, leaving the 50% treatment as
the baseline. The index j of the variable TREATMENT denotes observa-
tions coming from a given treatment. This enables us to study the di¤erential
e¤ects of pairs of treatments on propensity to accept, thus testing directly
H2a as well as performing a more stringent test of H1a.
Regression results are reported in Table 2. Column 1 reports results
for model (1) without including demographic controls Zi: CHANCE has
a strong and positive e¤ect, thus supporting H1a. For instance, the pre-
dicted probability of accepting an o¤er equal to 20% of the pie shifts from
0:95 when CHANCE = 0:5:to 0:75 for CHANCE = 0:2, and to 0:48 for
CHANCE = 0. Thus, receivers clearly reacted to procedural fairness in the
initial lottery, and were more likely to accept o¤ers when these came after
a less unbiased initial lottery. OFFER has a positive and strong e¤ect, as
expected. FAV OURED also has a positive sign and is signicant at the
5% level. Favoured subjects were more likely to accept o¤ers when drawn as
receivers than unfavoured subjects. As conjectured above, this may be due
to fairness considerations10.
The specication in the second column adds the demographic and individ-
ual characteristics measures Zi. CHANCE keeps a strong and positive e¤ect
in this specication, too, thus conrming the validity of H1a. OFFER and
FAV OURED also show positive and signicant e¤ects. Among the demo-
graphic variables, it is interesting to note that attending Economics degrees
signicantly increases probability of acceptance - this is so at the 5% level.
Hence, similarly to other experiments, Economics students show patterns of
behaviour closer to Homo Economicus(Marwell and Ames, 1981). More-
over, GENDER also exerts signicant e¤ects. Women are signicantly more
inclined to accept o¤ers than men. This is in line with Eckel and Grossman
10Note that this result is mainly driven by behaviour in 20%_FRC because there were
only four observations in which a favoured subject was drawn as receiver in 1%_FRC.
Qualitatively similar results to those illustrated hold when these four observations are
omitted.
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(2001). UK students were signicantly more likely to accept o¤ers, ceteris
paribus, than foreigners. Age did not exert signicant e¤ects.
Table 2, Column 3, reports the results for model (2) without including
individual characteristics Zi. Figure 3 reports the probabilities of acceptance
in each treatment for various o¤ers, as predicted by this model. ROUND
has been set to equal the last interaction, and FAV OURED is set at the
mean value of the sample. The horizontal axis reports point values for o¤ers
ranging from 5% to 35% of the pie. The estimated probability of acceptance
for each treatment is reported on the vertical axis. The diagram shows that
for any o¤er, as the bias of the initial lottery decreases, the probability of
acceptance increases. Probabilities are close to 0 (1) for the lowest (highest)
o¤er considered. For the other intermediate o¤er values, sizable di¤erences
emerge across treatments. For instance, for o¤ers equal to 20% of the pie,
the predicted probability of acceptance is equal to 0:92 in the baseline case,
drops to 0:85 in the 20%_FRC and to 0:69 in the 1%_FRC, and drops to a
mere 0:17 in the 0%_FRC. For o¤ers equal to 15% of the pie, the predicted
probability of acceptance is equal to 0:69 in the baseline case, drops to 0:51 in
the 20%_FRC and to 0:28 in the 1%_FRC. Finally, it goes down to 0:03 in
the 0%_FRC. Clearly, di¤erences are particularly pronounced comparing the
0%_FRC vis-à-vis other treatments, but are relevant in other treatments,
too.
Table 3 reports the z-statistics and standard errors of two-tailed Wald
tests over the null hypothesis Ho: k   l = 0 against H1: k   l 6= 0, for
each pair of TREATMENT coe¢ cients. k (l) is the row (column) entry.
This is done for model (3), but results for model (4) are virtually identical.
Note that a positive (negative) sign for the z-statistic means that probability
of acceptance was higher (lower) in treatment k (row entry) than in treatment
l (column entry). Table 3 supports hypothesis HP2a of a symbolic value of
opportunity. The di¤erence between 0%_FRC and 1%_FRC is negative and
signicant (P   value = 0:017). Receivers in 1%_FRC had, ceteris paribus,
a signicantly higher probability of accepting a given o¤er than receivers in
the 0%_FRC Hence, an assignment of even minimal opportunities seems
to matter a great deal for receivers of FRCTs. As for all other comparisons,
the di¤erence between 0%_FRC and the other two treatments coe¢ cients is
negative and signicantly di¤erent to 0 at less than the 1% level. The dif-
ference between 1%_FRC and both 50% is also signicantly di¤erent from 0
(P = 0:049). The di¤erences between 1%_FRC and 20%_FRC and 20%_FRC
and 50% are not large enough to reach signicance level, but it is notewor-
thy that all the signs in the Table are negative and thus in line with HP1a.
Overall, receivers of FRCTs seem to react to the increased bias of the initial
lottery, with a large portion of the di¤erences being driven by the sizable
reduction in the frequency of acceptance in 0%_FRC compared to all other
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treatments and 1%_FRC in particular.
Very similar results in the estimation of the  coe¢ cients obtain using
Model (4) of Table 2. It is noteworthy that individual characteristics bring
about the same e¤ects as those stressed for Model (2). The only di¤erence
is that FAV OURED drops out of the signicance region. We can thus
conclude:
Conclusion 1 Descriptive, graphical and econometric analysis supports HP1a.
Proof: Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses show the existence
of a negative relationship between the bias of the initial lottery and (a) the
mean and median value of rejected demands; (b) the acceptance rate of high
demands. Econometric analysis shows a strong and positive e¤ect of the vari-
able CHANCE over probability of acceptance. Pairwise comparisons between
treatment dummy coe¢ cients all have the correct sign and are statistically
signicant in four out of six cases.
Conclusion 2 Descriptive, graphical and econometric analysis supports HP2a.
Proof: Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses show (a) lower mean
and median values of rejected demands; (b) lower acceptance rate of high
demands, in the 0%_FRC compared to the 1%_FRC. Econometric analysis
shows a signicant di¤erence at the 5% level between 0%_FRC and 1%_FRC .
4.2 Proposers Behavior in FRC
4.2.1 Descriptive Analysis
Similar patterns to those observed above for receiversbehaviour are found
for proposersbehaviour. Again, the average proposal in the 0%_FRC treat-
ment is seemingly not too dissimilar from what found in other UGs. Oost-
erbeek et al. (2004) report average o¤ers equal to 59:5% of the pie from
75 UG experiments, whereas this is equal to 62:8% in our study. As the
initial lottery becomes more biased, both the mean and median proposals
of favoured proposers decrease (see Tables 1a-d, Columns 4), with the only
exception of 50% and FRC_20% where the median remains constant as we
move from the former to the latter. The drop in proposals is particularly
pronounced between 1%_FRC and 0%_FRC, consistently with H2b. More-
over, the frequency of high demands decreases with the bias of the initial
lottery.
Furthermore, the same monotonic pattern emerges between 20%_FRC
and 1%_FRC with respect to non-favoured proposers (see Tables 1a-d,
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Columns 5). Distinguishing between favoured and unfavoured proposers in
these two treatments is necessary, as the di¤erence in initial opportunities
may inuence their behaviour. It is interesting to note that unfavoured pro-
posers demanded more than their favoured counterparts in both 20%_FRC
and 1%_FRC. This di¤erence is statistically signicant in the 20%_FRC
according to a Mann-Whitney test at a signicance level of less than 1%
(z =  5:620; P < 0:001;n = 620), whereas it is not distinguishable from 0
in 1%_FRC (z = 0:19; P = 0:85;n1 = 640). Perhaps unfavoured proposers
tried to compensate for having been discriminated against in the initial lot-
tery by demanding a larger share of the pie. This would be consistent with
attempting to minimise the expected earnings between favoured and un-
favoured proposers. We return to this point below. However, the di¤erence
between favoured and unfavoured proposers is not statistically signicant in
1%_FRC. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the distribution of proposals tends
to become more skewed towards the left as the chances of the non-favored
player decrease.
4.2.2 Econometric Analysis
Even in this case we model the longitudinal characteristic of the data using
a random e¤ects model. We consider the following models, analogous to
models (1) and (2) of section 4.1.2:
DEMANDi;t = i + CHANCE + i;tUNFAV OURED + (3)
+tROUNDt + iZi + ui + "i;t
DEMANDi;t = i + jTREATMENTj + i;tUNFAV OURED +(4)
+tROUNDt + iZi + ui + "i;t
The dependent variableDEMAND is how much proposers demanded for
themselves. In model (3), the main independent variable is CHANCE (see
section 4.1.2). Moreover, all controls included in model 1, suitably adjusted,
are included here, too. In particular, UNFAVOURED identies subjects who
were in Player 2 role. The error structure includes an individual-specic error
term ui, and an observation-specic error term "i;t. To prevent the risk of
error heteroschedasticity, we use robust estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimator, with errors clustered on individuals (Froot, 1989).
Clustering makes it possible to treat errors as independent across decisions
from di¤erent individuals, and arbitrarily correlated for decisions made by
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the same individual11. Model (4) substitutes treatment dummies for the
CHANCE variable in model (3).
The results of the regression are reported in Table 4. Columns (1) and
(2) show that CHANCE has a positive and strongly signicant e¤ect, thus
supporting HP1b. Hence proposers behaviour, too, reacted markedly to
the degree of unbiasedness in the initial lottery. The higher the unbiased-
ness of the initial lottery, the higher proposersdemands. A weak e¤ect for
UNFAV OURED also emerges. Unfavoured players, knowing they had a
low probability of being selected as proposers, may have been less attentive
in their choices, or they may have applied di¤erent patterns of behaviour
compared to favoured players. For instance, they might have sought to com-
pensate for their overall disadvantaged position by demanding more than
favoured players. In line with what observed for receivers, Economics stu-
dents demanded signicantly more than students from other degrees. The
other demographic variables are not signicant predictors of DEMAND.
Specication introduces treatment dummies. Table 5 reports in each cell
(k,l) the z-statistics and the standard error for Wald tests over the null hy-
pothesis Ho: k   l = 0 against H1: k   l 6= 0,where k is the row entry
and l the column entry. Table 5 supports HP2b relative to the symbolic
value of opportunity. The di¤erence between FRC_0% and FRC_1% is neg-
ative and signicant (P = 0:024). Table 5 also supports hypothesis HP1b
postulating a monotonic relationship between the fairness of the initial lot-
tery and proposersdemands. All the coe¢ cient signs are in accord with this
hypothesis, apart from 20%_FRC-50% where the sign is positive but the co-
e¢ cient is indistinguishable from 0. In all of the other ve comparisons, the
lower the initial opportunity for the unfavoured player, the lower on average
the proposals in that treatment. The di¤erence across treatments is signi-
cant at the 1% level in three out of the six comparisons, and signicant at
the 5% level in two other comparisons. Specication 4 brings about similar
results to Specication 2 as far as  coe¢ cients are concerned, and conrms
the same individual characteristics e¤ects found in Specication (2).
Figure 2 also allows us to examine whether o¤ers made by proposers
were those maximising expected earnings, given the acceptance rates for
each treatment. The dotted line marked with asterisks shows the expected
earnings for each proposal category, given by the product of the acceptance
rate for that category and the lowest extreme of the interval. One can no-
tice that in two cases out of four, the mode of the proposal lies in the same
category as the payo¤maximising proposal. In the 0% _FRC the maximum
11Note that clustering on sessions instead of individuals would be inappropriate because
a necessary conditions for the validity of cluter-robust standard errors is that the number
of clusters tend to innity. Given the relatively small number of sessions, this assumption
would not be satised. See Woolridge (2002).
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is in the adjacent category and is very close to the payo¤ maximising cat-
egory. Only in the 1%_FRC can a sizable di¤erence be detected. Apart
from this case, proposersbehaviour seems to have converged towards the
income-maximising proposal.
On the grounds of this analysis, we conclude:
Conclusion 3 Descriptive, graphical and econometric analysis supports HP1b.
Proof: Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses show the existence of
a negative relationship between the bias of the initial lottery and the mean
and median proposals, the only exception being 50% and 20%_FRC where
proposals are very close. Econometric analysis shows a strong and positive
e¤ect of the variable CHANCE over demands as the lottery bias decreases.
Di¤erences between treatment dummy coe¢ cients all have the correct sign
and are statistically signicant in ve out of six cases.
Conclusion 4 Descriptive, graphical and econometric analysis supports HP2a.
Proof: Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses show lower mean
and median demands in the 0%_FRC than in the 1%_FRC. Economet-
ric analysis shows a signicant di¤erence at the 5% level between 0%_FRC
and 1%_FRC .
5 The Variable Role Condition
As illustrated in section 3, VRCTs have the same structure as FRCTs except
for the fact that in VRC a random assignment to the favoured or unfavoured
role occurs in each round, whereas in FRC players roles are xed by one
random draw prior to play. In this section we analyse jointly VRCTs and
the 50% treatment.
5.1 Analysis of ReceiversBehavior in VRC
5.1.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 shows that the monotonic pattern linking bias in the initial lottery
and rejection rates still holds moving from 0%_VRC to 20%_VRC, but is
reversed between 20%_VRC and 50%. Mean and median values of rejected
demands increase from 0%_VRC through 20%_VRC, but subsequently drop
when moving from 20%_VRC to 50%. Hence, receivershostility decreases
between 0%_VRC up to 20%_VRC, but then it rises again (see Tables
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1a,e-g, Columns 1). A similar trend can be detected with respect to the
acceptance rate of lowo¤ers (see Tables 1a, e-g, Columns 3).
Figure 2 shows a noticeable drop in acceptance rates for high demands in
0%_VRC, whereas acceptance rates remain high (i.e. higher than 80%) for a
larger class of proposals in the 20%_VRC than in other treatments. Figure
2 also bears out that the mode of proposals did not generally coincide with
the class with higher expected earnings, although the latter are generally
situated in an adjacent class.
5.1.2 Econometric Analysis
We t models analogous to (1) and (2) to analyse receiversbehaviour in
VRCTs (see section 4.1.2). The results are reported in Table 6. The main
result of specication (1) is that, contrary to what occurred for FRCTs, the
variable CHANCE is no longer signicant (Table 6, column 1). Clearly
the inversion of the monotonic trend between 20%_VRC and 50% already
observed in the descriptive statistics is what prevents this variable to be a
signicant predictor of acceptance rates. Specication (2) shows instead a
sizable increase of the coe¢ cient relative to CHANCE, which is now weakly
signicant (Table 6, column 2). However, we interpret this result with cau-
tion. We think this result is mostly due to the treatment 20%_VRC being
particularly a¤ected by missed observations in individual characteristics. The
elimination of the observations in this treatment clearly attenuates the weight
of the very treatment causing the break in monotonicity12.
As for the individual controls, ECONOMICS is not signicant this time,
but the sign is consistent with what found in section 4.1. GENDER is
again a signicant predictor of receiversbehaviour, with women more likely
to accept o¤ers. No signicant di¤erence emerges between UK students and
foreigners, and AGE is also insignicant. To check whether HP1a may hold
limitedly to a portion of the relevant interval, we add a squared term for
the variable CHANCE. The resulting specications (3) and (4) show that
both the linear term and the quadratic term have indeed signicant e¤ects,
particularly in specication (3) (see Table 6, columns 3 and 4). Probability
of acceptance reaches a maximum for CHANCE = 0:27 in specication 3
and 0:30 in specication 4. Hence, HP1a appears to be supported within a
limited region of the interval.
12In fact, using specication (1) on the same observations available for specication (2)
has the e¤ect of increasing the coe¢ cient of CHANCE to 2.15, which is nearly two thirds
of the overall increase of CHANCE. Therefore, we conjecture that about two thirds of the
increase in the CHANCE coe¢ cient is due to sample omissions and only one third to the
introduction of demographic controls.
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Specication (5) replaces CHANCE with treatment dummies, as per
model 2. Figure 4 depicts the predicted probability as per specication (5),
estimated in the last round of interaction at the mean value for FAV OURED
(see Table 6, column 5). The main feature of this diagram is that the three
treatments 0%_V RC; 1%_V RC; 20%_V RC, do follow a monotonic trend.
For instance, for o¤ers equal to 10% of the pie, the predicted probability
of acceptance is equal to 0:16 in the 0%_VRCT, and it rises to 0:40 in the
1%_V RC, and to 0:69 in 20%_V RC: However, rather than following the
monotonic trend, the probability of acceptance in 50% drops to 0:37, even
further below than the predicted probability in 1%_V RC. For o¤ers equal
to 15% of the pie, the predicted probability of acceptance is equal to 0:45 in
the 0%_VRCT, and it rises to 0:74 in the 1%_V RC, and 0:90 in 20%_V RC:
Even in this case, the probability of acceptance in 50% drops to 0:91, below
the 1%_V RC level of predicted probability.
Table 7 reports the results of Wald tests for the null hypothesis H0:
k   l = 0 against the hypothesis H1: k   l 6= 0. HP1a appears to
be supported limitedly to the three treatments 0%_VRC, 1%_VRC, and
20%_VRC. All the signs of the z-statistics are negative, and thus consis-
tent with the idea that less unbiasedness in the initial lotteries is associated
with higher acceptance rates. The di¤erence is weakly signicant between
1%_VRC and 20%_VRC (P = 0:078), and strongly signicant between
0%_VRC and 20%_VRC (P<0.01 ). This analysis conrms that respon-
ders in 50% did not behave in accordance to HP1a. The signs are con-
trary to the hypothesis for both 50%   1%_V RC and 50%   20%_V RC ;
and the test even results in a weakly signicant di¤erence in the latter case
(P = 0:051). Finally, the test returns a weakly negative signicant di¤erence
for 50%   0%_V RC (P = 0:084). As far as HP2a of a symbolic value of
opportunity is concerned, Table 7 shows support for the hypothesis, albeit
weakly. The di¤erence between 0%_V RC and 1%_V RC is negative and sig-
nicant at the 10% level (P = 0:063). Even in VRCTs, giving players a mere
1% of having their proposal selected raises the probability of acceptance in
comparison to giving no chance at all, though less markedly than in FRCTs.
Specication 6 brings about qualitatively similar results to specication 5 as
far as treatment dummies are concerned, and to specications (2) and (4)
with respect to demographic variables (see Table 6, column 6).
On the grounds of this analysis, we conclude:
Conclusion 5 Descriptive, graphical and econometric analysis supports HP1a
only limitedly to the 0%_V RC through 20%_VRCTs. The monotonic pat-
tern breaks between 20%_V RC and 50%:
Proof: Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses show the existence
of a negative relationship between the bias of the initial lottery and (a)
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the mean and median value of rejected demands; (b) the acceptance rate
of high demands, between 0%_V RC and 20%_V RC. The opposite occurs
between 20%_V RC and 50%: Econometric analysis shows no e¤ect for the
variable CHANCE over probability of acceptance, but a strong e¤ect when
a linear and a quadratic term are both included. The estimate suggests a
maximum around p = 0:30: All pairwise comparisons between 0%_V RC
through 20%_V RC have the correct signs and are statistically signicant
(weakly in two cases). Conversely, the di¤erence 50%   20%_V RC has the
wrong sign and is (weakly) statistically signicant.
Conclusion 6 Descriptive, graphical and econometric analysis supports HP2a.
Proof: Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses show (a) lower mean
and median values of rejected demands; (b) lower acceptance rate of high de-
mands, in the 0%_VRC than in the 1%_VRC. Econometric analysis shows
a signicant di¤erence at the 10% level between 0%_V RC and 1%_V RC .
5.2 Proposers Behavior in VRC
5.2.1 Descriptive Analysis
A pattern similar to what observed for receivers holds for proposers in VRCTs
(see Tables 1a,e-g, Columns 4). As far as being favoured in the lottery is con-
cerned, a striking di¤erence between VRCTs and FRCTs is given by the fact
that unfavoured proposers demand less than favoured proposers. This is the
case for both 20%_VRC and 1%_VRC. Although the di¤erence is statis-
tically signicant in the rst case (z = 1:884; P = 0:06;n = 600) but not
in the latter (z = 1:240; P = 0:22;n1 = 560): Hence, the intuition that
unfavoured proposers may demand more to compensate for their being dis-
advantaged in their chance to access the proposer role clearly does not hold
in this case. This hints at the possibility that players may have considered
the VRC procedure less unfair than the FRC procedure. We return to this
point in section 7.2. Likewise, Figure 2 shows that the distribution of pro-
posals is clearly more skewed towards the right in the 20%_VRC than in
the remaining treatments.
5.2.2 Econometric Analysis
Table 8 reports the results of regressions using models (3) and (4) applied to
VRCTs and 50% (see section 4.2.2). This analysis conrms the patterns ob-
served for responders behaviour. CHANCE is not signicant in either speci-
cation (1) or (2) (see Table 8, columns 1-2), but the inclusion of a quadratic
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term makes both coe¢ cients signicant predictors of proposersbehaviour
(see Table 8, columns 3-4). The models predicts the maximum to be reached
at CHANCE = 0:27 (specication 3) and CHANCE = 0:29 (specication
4). Hence, HP1b seems to hold for a region of similar size to what found
for respondersbehaviour. The analysis of Wald tests over di¤erences in 
conrms the validity of HP1b limitedly to the three treatments 0%_VRC,
1%_VRC, and 20%_VRC. The di¤erence between 20%_V RC and 1%_V RC
is not large enough to reach signicance levels (P = 0:22), but 0%_V RC is sig-
nicantly smaller than both 20%_V RC (P < 0:01) and 1%_V RC (P < 0:01).
HP2b relative to a symbolic value of opportunity for UG proposers is thus
strongly supported in VRCTs. Conversely, 20%_V RC is signicantly greater
than 50% (P < 0:01), thus reverting the previous trend, whereas the hy-
pothesis that 1%_V RC is the same as 50% cannot be rejected (P = 0:15)
and 0%_V RC is signicantly smaller than 50% (P < 0:01).
Even in this case, specication (6) controlling for individual characteris-
tics brings about qualitatively similar results to specication (5) (see Table
8, columns 5-6). It is noteworthy that unfavoured proposers demand sig-
nicantly less than favoured ones, this result being strongly signicant in
specications (1), (3), and (5), and weakly signicant in Specication (6).
This result is in contrast with what found in FRCTs. No e¤ect for individ-
ual characteristics can be detected. We thus conclude:
Conclusion 7 Descriptive, graphical and econometric analysis supports H1a
only limitedly to the 0%_V RC through 20%_VRCTs. The monotonic pat-
tern breaks between 20%_V RC and 50%:
Proof: Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses show the existence of
a negative relationship between the bias of the initial lottery and the mean
and median proposals limitedly to the 0%_V RC through 20%_VRCTs, but
the trend is reversed between 50% and 20%_V RC. Econometric analysis
shows a strong e¤ects for the linear and the quadratic term of CHANCE,
with a maximum being reached around p = 0:30. All pairwise comparisons
between 0%_V RC through 20%_VRCTs have the correct signs and are
statistically signicant in two out of three cases. Demands are signicantly
higher in 20%_V RC than 50%:
Conclusion 8 Descriptive, graphical and econometric analysis supports H2a
and H2b.
Proof: Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses show lower mean
and median demands in the 0%_VRC than in the 1%_VRC. Economet-
ric analysis shows a signicant di¤erence at the 1% level between 0%_V RC
and 1%_V RC .
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6 Results for First Round
The random e¤ects model used in the foregoing sections is a popular method
to analyse experimental data coming from repeated interactions (see e.g.
Dickinson, 2000; Armantier, 2006; Gächter and Thöni, 2010). However, it is
plausible that as interactions went on, subjects adapted their strategies to
the feedback received at the end of each interaction. In particular, it is quite
likely that proposers updated their beliefs over respondersminimum accept-
able o¤er on the basis of their past experience, and modied their demands
accordingly13. It is then interesting to investigate the priors that agents had
before such feedback were received. Is the monotonic behaviour that we
observed over the whole experiment something that subjects - proposers in
particular - anticipated right from the start? To answer this question we
analyse subjectsbehaviour in the rst round of interactions.
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics for the rst round of interactions
only. Although paucity of observations prevent us from drawing rm con-
clusions, patterns are striking similar to what we observed across the whole
20 rounds. In fact, proposals and rejected demands in the rst round of
FRCTs present an identical pattern to that emerging in the whole 20 rounds
as far as mean values are concerned, whereas there is one deviation from this
pattern for median values. This means that in the rst round receivers par-
ticipating in more biased initial lotteries gave proposers a harsher treatment
than receivers participating in less biased initial lotteries, and that proposers
correctly anticipated this. However, acceptance rates of small o¤ers do not
match the pattern observed across the 20 rounds. In VRCTs the pattern
in the rst round is the same as that observed over the whole 20 rounds,
except that the VRC_1% treatment lies above the VRC_20% in terms of
mean and median of rejected demands, and mean and median of proposals.
Figure 5 depicts mean proposals in each round. It is noteworthy that FRCTs
follow a monotonic pattern consistent with H1b, and a sizable gap between
FRC_0% and FRC_1% consistent with H2b exists.
We also use econometric specications analogous to those applied earlier.
The removal of the time component calls for estimation with a logit model for
acceptance and an OLS estimator for proposals. Moreover we drop controls
for individual characteristics Zi to save degrees of freedom and avoid missing
observations. The econometric specications we use are thus as follows:
13Indeed, in unreported analyses some variables dened over a subjects history in the
game (such as the number of demand having been rejected to a proposer) turn out as
strong predictors of future behaviour for proposers. Not surprisingly, past rejections have
a negative impact on subjectsdemands.
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ACCEPTANCEi;1 = i + CHANCE + i;1OFFER + (5)
+i;1FAV OURED + ui + "i;1
ACCEPTANCEi;1 = i + jTREATMENTj + i;1OFFER + (6)
+i;1FAV OURED + ui + "i;1
DEMANDi;1 = i +  1CHANCE + (7)
+i;1UNFAV OURED + ui + "i;1
DEMANDi;1 = i + jTREATMENTj + (8)
+i;1UNFAV OURED + ui + "i;t
Clearly the sharp decrease in the number of observations considerably re-
duces the power of statistical tests in comparison to regressions conducted on
the whole sample. All the same, we nd clear similarities to the patterns de-
tected over the whole 20 rounds. This is clearer in proposersbehaviour. As
shown in Table 14 (column 1), the variable CHANCE has a positive and sig-
nicant e¤ect in FRCTs. The pairwise comparisons of treatment coe¢ cients
from Model 2 (see Table 14, column 2), shows that the sign of coe¢ cient
di¤erences is always negative, consistently with HP1b (See Table 15). That
is, the higher the bias of the initial lottery, the lower the proposals. In two
cases such di¤erences are small, but in four out of the six comparisons the
di¤erences are statistically signicant. This is so when comparing 20%_FRC
with 1%_FRC (P = 0:098), 20%_FRC with 0%_FRC (P = 0:027), 50%
vis-à-vis 1%_FRC (P = 0:076) and 50% vis-à-vis 0%_FRC (P = 0:019).
HP2b is instead not supported in this case.
In the VRCT, HP1b cannot be supported because proposals are highest
in 1%_VRC, so CHANCE is no longer signicant (see Table 14, column 3).
Nevertheless, proposals in 0%_VRC are considerably lower than in all other
treatments (see Table 14, column 4, and Table 16). The di¤erence is strongly
signicant with respect to 1%_VRC (P = 0:009), thus clearly supporting
HP2b (See Table 16). Di¤erences are also signicant comparing 0%_VRC
to 20%_VRC (P = 0:025) and 0%_VRC to 50% (P = 0:012). However,
beyond this point the di¤erences are not consistent with a monotonic pattern,
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and they are in fact far from the conventional region of hypothesis rejection.
As already pointed out when commenting descriptive statistics, proposers
behaviour mirrors respondersactions. The pattern of signs in the acceptance
Tables mirrors that in the proposals Tables. This means that variations
in proposersbehaviour across treatments exactly matched respondersac-
tions. It seems that proposers were able to anticipate those treatments where
probabilities of acceptance were lower raising their o¤ers to receivers corre-
spondingly. We cannot say whether this is due to fairness considerations
by proposers or to their willingness to maximise income, though research on
this specic issue argues that both motives are present (Cox, 2004). More
in detail, signs of coe¢ cient pairs always change monotonically in FRCTs,
though di¤erences are never signicant (see Table 12). A binomial test sug-
gests that this pattern cannot be considered as random. The null hypothesis
of nding a positive and a negative sign with equal probability over the 6
tests conducted in Table 12 yields a P-value of B(6; 0:5) = 0; 016 and is thus
rejected. Although this test is not as stringent as that carried out above, this
evidence supports H1a in FRCTs.
In VRCTs, we observe a clear di¤erence in 0%_VRC compared to other
treatments, with di¤erence being signicant in 0%_VRC vis-à-vis 1%_VRC
(P = 0:003). This strongly supports HP2b. Di¤erences are also signicant in
0%_VRC vis-à-vis 20% (P = 0:042), 0%_VRC vis-à-vis 50% (P = 0:018).
In all other treatments, di¤erences appear small and are not signicant. We
conclude:
Conclusion 9 Descriptive analysis supports H1a in FRCTs. Descriptive,
graphical, and econometric analysis supports H1b in FRCTs.
Proof: In FRCTs mean and median values of rejected demands decrease
as the initial lottery becomes more biased (see Table 10). Moreover, a bi-
nomial test over the hypothesis that z-statistics of pairwise tests in FRCTs
have equal probability of being positive or negative is rejected at less than
the 5% level. This further supports H1a.
As for H1b, in FRCTs demands decrease monotonically as the bias of the
initial lottery decreases (See Table 10 and Figure 5). The variable CHANCE
has a positive sign and is statistically signicant at the 5% level (see Table
14, column 1). The z-statistics of pairwise tests are again all negative, and
in four out of the six cases the di¤erences are statistically signicant.
Conclusion 10 Descriptive, graphical, and econometric analyses support
H2a and H2b in VRCTs. Descriptive and graphical analyses supports H2a
and H2b in FRCTs.
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Proof: Descriptive statistics show lower mean and median values for re-
jected demands in the 0%_VRC than in the 1%_VRC, as well as lower
demands (see Table 10 and Figure 5). Pairwise tests over the null hypothesis
that 0%_V RC   1%_V RC = 0 strongly reject this hypothesis in both the
analysis of demands and acceptances, thus supporting both H2a and H2b.
Table 10 and Figure 5 also indicate lower mean and median values for
rejected demands in the 0%_FRC than in the 1%_FRC, as well as lower
demands. Finally, we put forward:
Conclusion 11 There exists a one-to-one correspondence between proposers
and responders behaviour across each treatment within VRC and FRCTs. As
the probability of rejection increases, demands decrease.
Proof: See comparison of Tables 12 and 15, and of Tables 13 and 16.
7 Comparing VRC and FRC
7.1 Comparison across all rounds
Let us focus on comparing FRCTs and VRCTs. If subjects were consequen-
tialist (see section 1), they would be indi¤erent between FRCTs and VRCTs
because their decision node takes place after Nature has moved, thus it bears
no consequence on their future strategies. Conversely, were subjects proce-
dural, they may take into account Natures moves prior to their choices. As
posited inH3a andH3b, we believe that procedural individuals see VRCTs as
implying a more fair procedure than FRCTs, thus we expect both acceptance
rates and demands to be higher in VRCTs compared to FRCTs.
We rst note that descriptive statistics from Table 1 support H3a and
H3b. For each pair of treatments - e.g. 20%_FRC vis-à-vis 20%_VRC,
the mean and median value of rejected demands, and the acceptance rate of
high demands, are all lower in FRCTs than VRCTs. Moreover, demands are
higher in VRC than FRC in each pair of treatments.
As for econometric analysis, we t models analogous to (2) and (4) for
pooled observations coming from FRCTs and VRCTs (see sections 4.1.2 and
4.2.2). This enables us to test directly for di¤erences in the coe¢ cients
associated with di¤erent treatments. The result of the analysis are reported
in Tables 17 and 21. Tables 18 through 20 (Tables 22 through 24) report in
each cell the coe¢ cient value and the standard error for k l, as estimated
in model (2) (model (4)) applied to the whole data. Row (column) entries
denote FRCTs (VRCTs). We only report the result of Wald tests on the
null H0: k   l = 0 against the hypothesis H1: k   l 6= 0 for the three
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pairs of treatments on the "diagonal" of all possible pairings. Acceptance
rates are ceteris paribus signicantly lower in FRCTs than in VRCTs in all
three comparisons. As shown in Table 18, the di¤erence is signicant at
less than the 5% level for 20%_FRC vis-à-vis 20%_VRC (P = 0:012) and
for 1%_FRC vis-à-vis 1%_VRC (P = 0:033), and strongly signicant for
0%_FRC vis-à-vis 0%_VRC (P < 0:01). Tests reported in Table 22 also
conrm that demands were signicantly lower in FRCTs than VRCTs, by a
factor of 0.48 GBP in 20%_FRC vis-à-vis 20%_VRC (P < 0:01), £ 0.42 in
1%_FRC vis-à-vis 1%_VRC (P < 0:01), and £ 0.26 in 0%_FRC vis-à-vis
0%_VRC (P < 0:095)14. We thus conclude:
Conclusion 12 Descriptive and econometric analyses support H3a and H3b.
Proof: See Table 1, Table 18 and 22.
7.2 Learning and strategies evolution
We turn to analyse the di¤erence between VRC and FRC by looking at the
evolution of strategies over time. We speculate that the break of monotonicity
we observe in VRCTs is due to the establishment of a "convention" assigning
favoured players a dominant role in the allocation of the pie. The existence
of a trend for some of the VRCTs is quite clear in Figure 5, which plots the
evolution over rounds of mean proposals from favored proposers. Secondly,
we t a model similar to the one used in the previous section. We replace all
round dummies by a single ROUND variable that simply equals the number
of the round to which an observation refers. It thus captures the existence
of trends in the evolution of proposals and acceptance rates over time. We
also add interaction terms of this variable with a dummy variable identifying
FRCTs (FRC_X_ROUND) and VRCTs (VRC_X_ROUND).
These models enable us to assess the existence of di¤erent trends in the
evolution of strategies between FRCTs and VRCTs. First we focus on re-
ceiversbehaviour. The coe¢ cient of ROUND refers to the baseline 50%
condition. The sign is positive and is signicant at the 5% level (See Table
17, column 2). As for FRCTs and VRCTs, the coe¢ cient estimate is only
weakly signicant for the FRC ( = 0:032; z=1:94; P = 0:052; N= 4260),
whereas it is strongly signicant for the VRC ( = 0:064; z=3.31; P < 0:01
; N= 4260). Notwithstanding, the coe¢ cient di¤erence between VRC and
14We have restricted the analysis to favoured proposers only. Including unfavoured
proposers would weaken the results, although the general pattern would be unaltered. As
already mentioned in sections 4 and 5, unfavoured proposers behaviour was dyammetrical
opposite in FRCTs and VRCTs, and this has the e¤ect of weakening the regression results
conducted over the unrestricted set of observations.
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FRC is not signicant ( = 0:032; z = 1:26; P = 0:208; N= 4260). It has
to be noted, though, that acceptance rates start o¤ at a considerably lower
level in FRC from the beginning ( = 1:409; z=2:73, P = 0:006 ; N= 4260).
So, the model predicts the probability of accepting an o¤er of 20% of the
pie is in round 20 equal to 69% in the average FRCT while it is 90% in the
average VRCT.
Although the sign of the coe¢ cient is positive, 14.6% of the proposals
(31 out of 231) are rejected even in the last round. We are thus very far
away from NE behaviour. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test strongly rejects the
hypothesis that acceptance rate is equal to 1 in the last round (z=  5:568;
P <0:0001). It is interesting to ask why responders softened upover time.
We doubt this is due to subjects learning to play the NE of the game. Should
this be the case, learning should be faster in the FRC than the VRC - because
FRC responders play more often in this role than VRC ones - but, if any-
thing, the opposite happens. As we argue below, we believe that the higher
intertemporal fairness of VRC made it possible for a convention to arise in
VRC, which made responders more lenient in VRC than FRC. All the same,
we do observe some evidence of increased willingness to accept in FRC, too.
We believe this is due to the fact that the "value" of punishing a greedy pro-
poser is higher in the rst rounds than in later rounds. This may be due to
either an "altruistic punishment" motive - if punishment "redeems" a greedy
proposer to making fairer o¤ers, the value of punishment in early rounds is
higher than punishing in later rounds - or to a purely selsh motive - since
there is a positive, albeit small, probability of meeting the same proposer in
future rounds, the value of early punishment is again higher.
Di¤erent is the case of proposals. Here no trend can be detected in neither
the 50% treatment (see Table 21, column 2), nor in FRCTs ( =  2:5X10 3;
z=0:63, P = 0:526), whereas a steep trend occurs in VRCTs ( = 0:02;
z=5:47, P < 0:01). The di¤erence between FRCTs and VRCTs is strongly
signicant ( =  0:021; z= 3:55, P < 0:01). It is worth noting that o¤ers
in the last round are still much lower than the SPNE of the game (See Figure
5). Rather than "learning" the NE of the game, we are inclined to believe
that subjects used information relative to receiversacceptance thresholds to
their own advantage. We summarise these results as follows:
Conclusion 13 Support for convergence towards the SPNE of the game is
limited.
We nd evidence of convergence in the direction of the SPNE of the game
only in VRCTs, where both acceptance rates and demands increase over time.
Weak evidence of convergence is also found in both FRC and 50% treatments
but limitedly to acceptance rates. Conclusions are similar even if we analyse
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single treatments separately15. Both acceptance rates and demands are very
distant from the game SPNE in the last round of the game.
Proof: See Table 17 and 21.
7.2.1 A social norm emerging in VRCTs?
To understand the extent to which the two sets of treatments di¤ered at
the beginning and at the end of the interaction we have tted the same
econometric specications illustrated in section 7.1 to the rst and last ve
rounds only, and then runWald tests over the null hypothesis that coe¢ cients
di¤er between FRC and VRC in corresponding treatments. Overall, the
picture that emerges is one of very small di¤erences, if any, at the beginning of
the interactions, and of large di¤erences at the end. Di¤erences are weak for
proposals in FRC_1% and VRC_1% (P = 0:055), and non-existing in the
other two cases (see Table 23). Conversely, in the last ve rounds proposers in
VRCTs demand signicantly more than FRC proposers in all treatments, the
di¤erences being strongly signicant in the 20% and the 0% treatment, and
signicant in the 1% treatment (P = 0:012). Acceptance rates are already
higher in the rst ve rounds in VRCTs compared to FRCTs, particularly in
the 1% treatment (P < 0:01), but also in the 20% treatment (P = 0:091),
whereas no statistical di¤erence emerges in the 0% treatment (see Table
19). Perhaps receivers in the 1%_FRC treatment perceived the unfairness
of the procedure even more than participants in the 0%_ FRC . All the
same, di¤erences grew even larger at the end of the interactions. Responders
were signicantly more likely to accept a given o¤er in the 0% treatment
(P < 0:01), in the 1% treatments (P = 0:024) and in the 20% treatment
(P = 0:035).
One can conclude that the pronounced di¤erences we observe between
15Fitting to individual treatments the same model for PROPOSAL as the one con-
sidered in this section, yields the following values for the coe¢ cient of PERIOD:  =
0.011(p = 0:236) in 50%,  = :008(p = 0:124) in 20%_FRC,  =  :006(p = 0:555) in
1%_FRC,c  =  :006(p = 0:349) in 0%_V RC,  = 0.030 (p < 0:01) in 20%_V RC,
 = 0:007 (p = 0:407) in 1%_V RC;  = :036 (p < 0:01) in 0%_V RC:As for
ACCEPTANCE, we nd the following values:  = 0.037(p = 0:501) in 50%;  =
0:059(p = 0:086) in 20%_FRC,  = 0:083(p < 0:01) in 1%_FRC,  =  :0242(p = 0:356)
in 0%_FRC,  = 0:057(p = 0:252) in 20%_V RC,  = 0:035(p = 0:256) in 1%_V RC,
 = 0:165(p < 0:01) in 0%_V RC.
Hence, 0%_V RC is the only treatment in which both proposals and acceptance rates
increased signicantly over time. Proposals grew strongly in 20%_V RC but this time the
coe¢ cient term for acceptance was not signicant at conventional levels. However, this is
partly due to the drop in observations brought about by the introduction of demographic
controls. If we remove these, the PERIOD coe¢ cient is positive and strongly signicant
for 20%_V RC, too.
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VRC and FRC over the whole 20 rounds are relatively small at the be-
ginning of the interactions, but grow larger as the number of interactions
increases. This is particularly the case for proposersbehaviour. It is thus
clear that they are not the result of the beliefs held by players prior to the
start of the interactions. It is instead plausible, although our design does
not enable us to prove it, that what we observe is the result of the estab-
lishment of a convention in VRC. Hargreaves-Heap and Vaourofakis (2002;
HHV henceforth) dene a convention as the situation in which players use an
exogenously given characteristic to solve a co-ordination problem. In their
experiments, such characteristic was the assignment of players to one of two
colours and the interaction was the Hawk-Dove game. They found that as
time went by players being assigned one colour played "Hawk" with higher
frequency whereas those assigned the other colour played Dove with higher
frequency. This obviously resulted in increased e¢ ciency than the control
case where no colour was assigned. Colour assignment was entirely random,
and, in principle, completely irrelevant to the strategic interaction. The es-
tablishment of such convention took time, but was rather stable towards the
end of the interaction.
We believe something similar occurred in our VRCTs. Players used the
assignment to the favoured role in the random draw as a characteristic en-
abling them to demand a larger share of the pie - thus acting more "hawk-
ishly" - whereas players being assigned to the unfavoured role accepted with
higher frequency such demands - thus acting more like "doves" - in compar-
ison to FRCTs. In other words, players used an exogenously given charac-
teristic of the interaction - in a sense analogous to the colour assignment - to
"co-ordinate" over an equilibrium assigning around three quarters of the pie
to the proposer. Admittedly, in our game such characteristic is not irrelevant
to the interaction, as it has a direct inuence in determining the odds with
which a proposal is selected. All the same, it may be deemed as sharing simi-
lar properties to a convention in HHV game. The second important di¤erence
between HHV and our experiments lies in that their colour assignment was
invariant throughout the whole of the interaction, whilst in our VRCTs the
random assignment occurred at each round. However, we believe that the
nature of the HHV result carries over to our case as well. It was exactly this
feature of the interaction that explains why the convention got established in
VRCTs and not in FRCTs. Only on the backdrop of overall inter-temporal
fairness did VRC receivers accept the higher inequality of the distribution
in comparison to FRCTs. This is hardly surprising. It is easier to stick to
a disadvantageous convention today knowing the same convention may turn
advantageous tomorrow, rather than sticking to a convention in which one is
always on the receiving end.
We believe this account also helps explain the reversal in monotonicity
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that we observe in VRCTs with respect to the 50% treatment. If subjects
were only concerned with procedural fairness, and if there existed a (negative)
monotonic relationship between overall procedural fairness and acceptance
rates, then we should clearly observe higher or equal acceptance rates in
50% compared to 20%_VRC. The opposite occurs instead. We tentatively
conjecture that the existence of a characteristic able to di¤erentiate players
at each round has made it possible that players reduced their overall level of
conictuality. Perhaps surprisingly, the existence of a characteristic randomly
di¤erentiating players in terms of their luck made it more salient that subjects
would be favoured on average half of the times and be unfavoured the other
half. This may have induced them to nd the asymmetric distribution of
power in UG more acceptable, thus reducing their conictuality rate.
In fact, the random assignment of roles to individual leads to surprising
consequences in terms of overall e¢ ciency and allocation inequality. Figure
6 o¤ers a graphical representation of the share of total surplus that (a) has
gone lost because of receiversrejection (black segment of the bar), (b) has
been accrued to proposers (grey segment of the bar), (c) has been accrued to
receivers (white segment of the bar), for each of the treatments. It is worth
noting that the two treatments where losses are lowest are 20%_VRC and
0%_VRC. Acceptance rates over the whole 20 rounds are exactly the same
in these two treatments (85%). 20%_FRC comes third, with an acceptance
rate of 84%, and 50% is only fourth in this ranking, with an acceptance
rate of 81%. In the last ve rounds of the game (See Figure 6b), all three
VRCTs present lower conictuality rates than 50%. Such di¤erences are not
huge but are sizable. A Mann-Whitney test conducted on the dicotomic
variable ACCEPT between 50% and 20%_VRC over the whole 20 rounds
rejects the null that observations come from the same distribution, though
only weakly ( z =  1:657, p=0:0976, N=1220). Exactly the same result
holds comparing the distribution of ACCEPT between 50% and 0%_VRC.
What is also interesting to note is that overall inequality between proposers
and receivers is considerably lower in 0%_VRC than in both 20%_VRC and
50%. Running a Mann-Whitney test on receivers payo¤s yields a strongly
signicant di¤erence favouring 0%_VRC compared to 20%_VRC ( z = -
10.238, p<0:01, N=1200) and 50% ( z = -5.896, p<0:01, N=1200). In fact,
only 0%_FRC guarantees receivers a higher share ( z = 3.111, p= 0.0019,
N=1220).
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8 A post-hoc model
8.1 Existing models of other-regarding preferences
In this section we try to move towards an explanation connecting the concept
of opportunity with allocation inequality. Our results show the existence of
a generally increasing monotonic pattern in the relationship between fair
allocation of opportunities on the one hand, and demands and probability
of acceptance on the other- with the exception of the non-linearity found in
VRCTs (see section 5). Moreover, we nd a "discontinuous" jump between
the 0% and the 1% treatments, which is strong and robust in both FRCTs
and VRCTs (see sections 4 and 5).
Before introducing our own explanation, let us briey discuss why tradi-
tional models fail to explain our result. There are three main class of models
that departs from the traditional rational choice theory and o¤er explana-
tions for the anomalies observed in laboratory experiments. The rst group
of models assume that individuals maximize well dened preferences, but
permit preferences to depend on the payo¤s of other players. FS and BO
among others have followed this approach and have suggested specic func-
tional form for interdependent preferences. These utility function, in general,
could be written in the following form:
ui(x) = xi + ij(xi   xj)xj (9)
ui(x) is agent is utility given an allocation x where xi and xj denote the
shares of i and j respectively. The function ij is the source of interdepen-
dence - it connects is utility with js share. In this formulation, it is easy to
see that irrespective of the opportunity level, the responders behaviour in a
UG always remains the same. Hence, proposersbehaviour will also remain
una¤ected by the opportunity level as well as the ex-post inequality in allo-
cation. A second approach seeks to introduce fairness concerns directly into
the utility function, by making individualsutility dependent on the charac-
teristics of the lotteries they face in their decisional process. For instance,
Trautmann (2009) applies FS model of inequality aversion to expected payo¤s
rather than nal payo¤s. In similar fashion, BBO extend the original BO
model by dening the "fairest" available allocation in the game as the closest
possible - in expected value - to the equal divide, after taking into account
playersstrategy sets and the set of lotteries available for choice. Individ-
uals condition their social motivations to the distance between the actual
allocation and the fairest allocation possible. In this way, preferences over
procedures may be accommodated directly into utility functions. A third
stream of argument is based on reciprocity and permits the preference over
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outcomes to depend on the context in which the outcome was reached (see
e.g. Rabin, 1993).
The reason why these approaches fail to account for our results is ulti-
mately that they make individualsutilities depend either on nal allocations,
or on lotteries that are directly dened over such allocations. However, in
our experiments the only source of variation across treatments is given by
lotteries determining the game initial positions, rather than nal allocations.
As such, these lotteries cannot but be irrelevant for these models16. Fur-
thermore, such models are continuous in nature and are thus unsuitable
to explain the discontinuous jump that we observe between no opportunity
and positive opportunity settings. Finally, although the context dependence
of the third class of models sounds promising in our setup, the source of
unfairness in our setting is due to external lotteries rather than human ac-
tion. Therefore, intention-based reciprocity cannot be held responsible for
our ndings.
8.2 Envy factor dependent on Opportunity
Here, we demonstrate that a simple combination of inequality aversion model
with Nozicks idea of symbolic utility can rationalise our ndings. It would
be proper to mention at this stage that our aim is no broader than that. We
neither claim this to be the only possible explanation nor we propose symbolic
utility to be the basis of a new social utility model. The analysis we sketch
here is rudimentary and leaves many important questions unanswered. We
propose a simple extension of the inequality aversion model introduced by FS.
In a two-person society, FS utility function for an agent can be represented
16A possible strategy for models of the second class to accommodate lotteries applied
to initial positions, rather than to nal outcomes, may be the following. Let us call I
(F ) lotteries dened over the initial (nal) positions of the game. We argued that the
main limitation of models of the second class was that no payo¤ can directly be attached
to I . However, subjects may attach their subjective expected payo¤ to I ;either taking
into account their previous experience in the game, or their a priori beliefs over others
behaviour. For instance, individuals may use their subjective distribution of a receivers
probability of rejection of a given o¤er to attribute an expected value to being selected as
proposer of the game. Likewise, individuals may use their subjective distribution of prob-
ability of receiving a certain o¤er from a proposer, and determine the expected payo¤s on
the basis of their own minimum acceptable o¤ers. In this way, expected payo¤s may be
indirectly attributed to all the events associated with I . Such expected payo¤s may thus
be used in a similar fashion as the "objective" payo¤s that can be derived from F . The
main problem of this strategy is obviously that the subjective expected payo¤s so deter-
mined may (widely) di¤er across individuals, thus making it di¢ cult for an equilibrium to
become established.
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as follows:
ui(x) = xi   imax(xj   xi; 0)  imax(xi   xj; 0) (10)
where xi and xj are share of agent i and j respectively. i  0 is the envy
factor and 0  i  i is the altruism factor. Our experimental results,
in particular, rejection rate across di¤erent opportunity level suggests that
opportunityenters into the utility function through the envy factor. That
is, i is not a constant but depends on p, where p is a measure of opportunity.
We have already argued that in our settings it is simply the probability with
which a proposal from an unfavoured player is selected as a proposal. Thus
p can vary between 0 and 0:5. Moreover, one can expect that the higher
the di¤erence in opportunity levels between the two players, the stronger the
envy factor. That is i(p) is a decreasing function in p. Following FS, we
assume that the proposer does not know the exact value of the envy factor of
the responder, but knows that it is distributed according to some distribution
function Fp(). The equivalent of decreasing function i(p) in this setup is
as follows. If p1 > p2 then Fp2 rst-order stochastically dominates Fp1.
To keep our model simple we assume i = 0 and we use our toy model to
explain two main observations: i) ceteris paribus, a decrease in inequality of
opportunity (that is, an increase in p) increases the probability of acceptance
of a proposal and ii) a decrease in inequality of opportunity increases the
inequality of the allocation.
Suppose j is the proposer and i is the responder. Since, xi and xj denote
the share of agent i and j respectively, we have xi + xj = 1. First note that
in equilibrium, xj  0:5. Otherwise j can increase her utility because any
xj < 0:5 will be accepted by i. Thus (xj   xi)  0 and agent i accepts
a proposal if and only if [xi   i(xj   xi)]  0. Equivalently, an o¤er will
be accepted if and only if i  xi1 2xi . Hence, the probability with which
xi is accepted is Fp

xi
1 2xi

. If p1 > p2 then Fp2 rst-order stochastically
dominates Fp1, implying Fp1

xi
1 2xi

 Fp2

xi
1 2xi

. That is probability of
acceptance increases with p.
Now, the expected payo¤ of the proposer is
h
(1  xi)Fp

xi
1 2xi
i
. Thus
agent j chooses xi which maximizes
h
(1  xi)Fp

xi
1 2xi
i
. The rst order
condition is as follows,
(1  xi)
(1  2xi)2 =
Fp

xi
1 2xi

fp

xi
1 2xi
 (11)
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where fp is the density function. To show our next result on allocation
inequality, we need to make further assumptions on F . We assume that f is
non increasing. Moreover we only consider one particular type of rst order
stochastic dominance which comes from a shift in the support. For example,
consider the following family of exponential distribution,
fp(t) =

e (t a(p)) if t  a(p)
0 otherwise
(12)
where a(p) is a decreasing function of p. One can check that if p1 > p2 then
Fp1 (t)  Fp2 (t) for all t. p1 > p2 also implies a(p1) < a(p2) and hence for all
t, fp1(t)  fp2(t). Therefore, for all xi
Fp1

xi
1 2xi

fp1

xi
1 2xi
  Fp2

xi
1 2xi

fp2

xi
1 2xi
 (13)
Note that the left-hand side of Equation 11 is an increasing function of xi
and starts above the right hand side (at xi = 0). Let xi(p) be the equilibrium
share of the pie that j o¤ers to i, where
xi(p) = fminxijxi satises Equation 11} (14)
Thus for all xi < xi(p1), we have
(1 xi)
(1 2xi)2 >
Fp1

xi
1 2xi

fp1

xi
1 2xi
 . By Equation
13, (1 xi)
(1 2xi)2 >
Fp2

xi
1 2xi

fp2

xi
1 2xi
 for all xi < xi(p1). Therefore xi(p2)  xi(p1).
That is, inequality of allocation increases with a decrease in inequality of
opportunity. From the data (see sections 4 and 5) we observe a jump from
p = 0 to p = 0:01. This can be accommodated in our post-hoc model if we
assume that there is a jump from F0 to Fp for any p > 0. This is consistent
with what we called the Symbolic Opportunity Hypothesis. As illustrated in
section 3, our application of Nozicks symbolic utility argument to our case
is that the purely symbolic opportunity of submitting a proposal in the game
su¢ ces to give "expressive" (or symbolic) utility to the agent that adds to
the intrinsic utility. Such symbolic act su¢ ces to make the overall assessment
of procedures as more fair than when this act is not possible, thus making
receivers more lenient to accept o¤ers, ceteris paribus. This may thus explain
the discontinuity between F0 and F0:1.
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9 Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the present study. First, we
nd robust support for the Monotonic Fairness Hypothesis in FRCTs. The
greater the inequality in the distribution of initial opportunities, the lower
the acceptance rates of a given o¤er. Consequently, average o¤ers increase.
In VRCTs we instead nd an inverted-U pattern. The trend in acceptance
rates and proposals increases between 0% and 20%, but then su¤ers a re-
versal, as we nd higher acceptance and inequality rates in the 20%_VRC
treatment than in the equal opportunity treatment. Overall, it is striking
that manipulations of initial opportunities which should leave a consequen-
tialist player indi¤erent seem to matter a great deal to individuals. Although
several other studies have emphasised the relevance of procedural fairness,
we believe our study to be the rst to investigate the issue, systematically
varying the degree of initial opportunity over the whole range of the scale.
Another exception is Suleiman (1996), who analyses behavioural patterns as-
sociated with changes in a "structural" parameter over the whole extension
of the relevant interval. Nevertheless, in his study procedural changes are
mixed with payo¤ changes (see section 2), so cannot be deemed to be sin-
gling out the purely procedural aspect of fairness. We discuss below possible
reasons for the break in monotonicity in VRCTs.
Second, we nd clear support for the Symbolic Opportunity Hypothesis.
In both FRCTs and VRCTs, receivers act signicantly more leniently after
having been previously assigned a mere 1% initial chance of acting as pro-
posers compared to having no chance. We believe that ours is the rst study
nding such a clear variation in behaviour associated with such a small mod-
ication of chances in an experimental context. Our results are reminiscent
of those by Suleiman (1996), and Handgraaf et al. (2004), who nd some
signicant changes in behavioural patterns between the "corner" and the in-
terior of the interval scale. However, their ndings have nothing to do with
the attribution of symbolic chances to unfavoured players, but rather to a
sense of "responsibility" by favoured players (see in particular Handgraaf et
al., 2004).
In this fashion, our study validates experimentally other pieces of em-
pirical and survey evidence regarding the importance of "voice" for people.
Frey and Stutzer (2005) nd support for the thesis that the mere right to
participate in the political process - rather than actual participation - in-
creases individual satisfaction - a phenomenon they refer to as "procedural
utility". Anand (2001) reports survey evidence supporting the importance
people place on having the right to have their opinion heard - or appropri-
ately represented - in collective decision processes. The relevance of this right
to voice may be caused by the desire to express ones position, or to obtain
39
respect for ones worth.
As a matter of fact, in our experiments we are not able to disentangle
whether such a result is due to the purely procedural aspect of having a say
in the collective decision problem, or to the actual allocation of a 1% chance
of acquiring the advantaged position. Discriminating between these two in-
terpretations would call for the running of a treatment where subjects have
a 0% chance of having their proposal submitted, but are nonetheless asked
to submit a proposal17. In other words, the symbolic value of opportunity
may matter for individuals in a purely representative sense, even if it is not
attached to any chance - as small as it may be - of inuencing the assign-
ment of positions. This is certainly an interesting topic worth studying in
the continuation of our research.
Third, we also nd support for the Dynamic Opportunities Hypothesis.
Acceptance rates are signicantly higher in VRCTs than FRCTs, and as a
consequence, proposersdemands are also higher. As argued in section 3, this
is consistent with our claim that subjects see VRCTs as a fairer procedure by
which to allocate initial opportunities. It appears that players are prepared
to accept even extreme levels of opportunity inequality within each round,
in exchange for overall equality of opportunity across the whole series of
interactions.
What we did not expect is that each VRC treatment ended up with even
lower conictuality rates - and thus greater e¢ ciency - than the baseline case
of equal opportunities. This result is arguably worth more investigation.
It may be the case that VRCTs simply made more salient to subjects the
possibility of achieving some form of fairness, albeit in a dynamic rather than
in a static sense, thus inducing subjects to become more lenient over proposed
allocations. Perhaps paradoxically, the treatment that allows perfect fairness
both in a static and in a dynamic sense is less conducive than VRCTs to elicit
such a perception, and consequently conictuality is higher.
However, our ndings may point to something more substantial. One
hypothesis that is worth examining in future research is whether creating
"spheres" of relative advantage of opportunity is conducive to a public en-
dorsement as potent as that of granting equal opportunities under all cir-
cumstances. For instance, a¢ rmative action has been criticised as a measure
for redressing unfairly distributed initial opportunities on the grounds that it
grants unfair advantage to some groups of normally disadvantaged people. It
has been argued that a truly meritocratic society should not grant a specic
advantage to someone in any domain, even if this person happens to be gen-
erally disadvantaged. Our results stress that, on the contrary, people may
perceive favourably the allocation of preferential advantage to some people in
17We thank Tim Salmon for this suggestion.
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some domains, even when the degree of favouritism is very high. Admittedly,
this occurs within a context of overall equality of opportunity, thus it may
not generalise to other contexts. Obviously we do not need to be reminded of
the wide gulf existing between our experiments and real-life social relations,
especially when a topic as important as that of opportunities is concerned.
However, at the very least we believe that our research points to the possibil-
ity that individualsendorsement of the fairness of opportunity distribution
over time may not be as clear-cut as one may at rst have thought.
Fourth, we nd strong evidence of convergence towards the SPNE only
in VRCTs, whereas in FRCTs and the 50% treatment, this occurs only for
receivers but not for proposers. We have argued that this is not due to
"learning". If that was the case convergence should have been faster in
FRCTs, where there is less variation across roles. Rather, in section 7.2
we conjectured that it may be due to the emergence of a specic social
norm of fairness emerging in VRCTs, whose characteristics have already been
discussed above. We also found that most of the patterns emerging over the
whole period of interactions were already present in the rst round. Proposers
were able to anticipate correctly the variation of receiversbehaviour across
treatments.
To sum up, we believe that our study conrms and substantially extends
recent survey and experimental evidence regarding the relevance of proce-
dural fairness for individuals. The major innovation of our study has been
to focus on the fairness in the assignment of initial positions in a standard
problem of division of resources. This is a topic of paramount importance for
our societies. However, it had been so far neglected in experimental studies,
which had focussed on procedural fairness related to nal allocations. Our
results show that the most basic results gained so far in the context of nal
positions carry over to the case of initial positions. More specically, sub-
jects are sensitive to the fairness in the assignment of initial positions. This
calls for an extension of existing theoretical models, which in their current
form fail to attach any relevance to the way initial positions are assigned.
We have o¤ered a theoretical extension that goes in this direction, although
others are possible. However, some of our results - such as the symbolic value
of opportunities, and the relevance of the dynamic allocation of opportunity
- are entirely novel.
We have also shown and debated how some of our ndings escape a
straightforward theoretical rationalisation, thus indicating further avenues
of research. More generally, we believe that an open question in the lit-
erature is the assessment of the relative importance of procedural fairness
vis-à-vis individual merit, responsibility, or needs, in acquiring certain po-
sitions. We have already stated that existing studies seem to imply that
individual merit or responsibility prevail over procedural fairness when the
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two are considered jointly. For instance, Anand (2001) reports situations -
such as health care decisions - where random lotteries are deemed as unfair
by survey respondents. Other experimental studies seem to agree with this
hypothesis (Krawczyk, 2010; Schurter and Wilson, 2009; Cappelen et al.,
2010). However, we believe that the available evidence is still too limited
to draw any rm conclusion. More in-depth research on the role and the
interplay among the various components of an individuals sense of justice
is, to be sure, needed to shed light on these issues.
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A Instructions
Welcome to this research project. A team of researchers is looking at the way
in which people make decisions. If you pay close attention to the instructions
then you could make a signicant amount of money. The research team that
is here today includes myself, Gianluca Grimalda, and my assistants.
Before starting with the explanation of the decisions you are going to
make, please pay attention to some important information and recommen-
dations.
In this project you are going to be asked to make decisions with other
people who are currently in this room. Your choices, and the choices of others,
will be matched with the help of a computer programme as we proceed. It
is important for you to note that all interactions are entirely anonymous.
Firstly, we will not know anything about your choices and your payment.
We will just record your choices through the ID number that you have just
drawn, and the payments will be made using that number as identication. It
is therefore important that you do not lose the card you have drawn, because
that is the only document that enables you to be paid. You may collect your
payments at the end of this session. You will be required to sign a receipt, but
there is no need for you to print your name. University administration does
require that you write in your student number when signing this receipt.
However, your student number will be held condentially by our research
group, and we will not make any attempt to link your student number to the
decisions you have made.
At the end of your decisions, while we prepare your payments, we would
ask that you complete a short questionnaire. You are required to state your
Student ID number. Even in this case, your responses to this questionnaire
will be held under condentiality rules by our research group.
Secondly, the decisions you are going to make involve interacting with
other people who are present in this room. However, you will not have to talk
or communicate directly in any way with anybody in this room. Instead, your
decisions will be processed through a computer programme that networks all
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of the computers in this room. In this way, nobody will be able to identify
with whom s/he is actually making decisions. The interaction will proceed
as follows: You will receive some messages on the screen in front of you.
This will either include some information on the state of the decisions, or
prompt you to make certain choices. Once you are sure about your choice,
you have to press the button OK, which will take you to the next stages of
the decisions. At times, you will be asked to wait for further instructions,
because it may take a bit of time before the programme processes all your
decisions.
If you are not clear on this or on other issues, please raise your hand.
You will be involved in 20 di¤erent interactions with other people in this
room. In each interaction, you will be paired with another person, and the
two of you will be making a decision together. Our programme will draw
at random the pairs at the beginning of each interaction. This means that
with very high probability you will be paired with a di¤erent partner at each
interaction.
As you will see, the decisions involve money. In each decision there will
be £ 10 at stake. Unfortunately, we will not be able to pay you for each
decision you make, but only for TWO interactions out of the 20. These will
be drawn at random at the end of this session, and everyone will be paid
according to the outcome of those 2 rounds. In this way, you are required to
pay maximum attention to each decision you are going to make, because only
at the end of the session we will learn which ones determine your payments.
We are now going to look at the simple rules that will govern each of the
interactions:
 [All treatments]: An amount worth £ 10 is to be divided between you
and the person you have been paired with.
 [1%, 20%, 50%]: Both of you are asked to make a proposal. [0%]:
One of the two people is drawn at random, and both people are informed
about whether s/he has been selected or not. The person who has been
selected is asked to make a proposal. [All treatments] : The proposal is any
amount X less than or equal to £ 10 that the proposerwants to keep for
him/herself. The proposer may use any number up to the second decimal
digit. The residual amount (10-X) is to be assigned to the other person in
the group (the receiver).
 [1%, 20%, 50%]: Once you and the other person in your group
have submitted your proposals, one of them is drawn at random. [1%, 20%]:
The random selection works as follows. Half of the people in this room are
favoured with respect to the others in having their proposals selected. In
particular, half of the people in this room have a [1-p]% probability that
their proposals will be selected within their groups, whereas the others have
a [p]% probability. [{p= 0.01, 0.2}] [50%]: There is a 50-50 probability that
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either proposal is extracted.
 [0%]: Each group is composed of a proposer and a receiver.
Whether you will act as a proposer or as a receiver is determined by a ran-
dom draw that will occur [0%_FRC]: before the rst round. Your role will
remain the same throughout the 20 rounds. [0%_VRC]: before each round.
[1%, 20%]: Each group will be made up of a person with a [1-p]% proba-
bility and another person with a [p]% probability of their proposals being
selected. [{p= 0.01, 0.2}] You will be informed about which probability
your proposal has of being selected [1%_FRC, 20%_FRC]: before the rst
round, and this probability will remain the same throughout all the remaining
rounds. [1%_VRC, 20%_VRC]: before submitting it.
 [All treatments]: The person whose proposal has been selected (the
proposer) is asked to wait for the decision of the other person in the group.
The person whose proposal has not been selected (the receiver), is informed
of the share allocated to him/her by the proposal of the other person. She
is then asked to either ACCEPT or REJECT this proposal.
 [All treatments]: If the receiver accepts this proposal, then every-
one gets the share determined by this proposal. If the receiver rejects this
proposal, then both people in the group get £ 0 each.
 [All treatments]: At the end of each interaction, a new random draw
will take place to determine your next partner. [For FRCTs only]: This will
be a person from the half of the people in this room with a probability
di¤erent from yours of their proposals being selected. [All treatments]: It
is therefore very unlikely you will be paired with the same person again.
Moreover, all decisions are independent. What you do in a round does not
inuence the next rounds and is not inuenced by the previous rounds.
Examples and comprehension test follow.
49
Figure 1: Game tree of the stage game 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Responses and Demands per Treatment 
 
Table 1a: Eq-Opp. 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7.85 81.45% 53.7% 6.97  
St. Dev 0.85 0.39 0.50 1.07  
Median 8   7.00  
Obs 115 620 134 1240  
 
 
Table 1b:FRC 20% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7.61 84.03% 52.7% 6.89 7.17 
St. Dev 0.75 0.37 0.50 0.82 1.09 
Median 7.6   7.00 7.20 
Obs 99 620 91 620 620 
 
 
Table 1e: VRC 20% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 8.39 85% 66.6% 7.37 7.13 
St. Dev 0.75 0.36 0 .47 0.98 1.40 
Median 8.4   7.50 7.50 
Obs 90 600 225 600 600 
 
Table 1c:FRC 1% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7.47 78.91% 46.9% 6.77 6.62 
St. Dev 0.71 0.41 0 .50 0.88 1.77 
Median 7.5   6.99 6.75 
Obs 135 640 66 640 640 
 
Table 1f: VRC 1% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7.97 81.07% 51.4% 7.20 6.87 
St. Dev 0.78 0.39 0 .50 0.90 1.79 
Median 8   7.00 7.00 
Obs 106 560 134 560 560 
 
Table 1d:FRC 0% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7.04 77.58% 21.7%  6.28  
St. Dev 0.71 0.42 0.42  0.91  
Median 7     6.17  
Obs 139 620 23 620  
 
Table 1g: VRC 0% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7.56 85% 47.1% 6.56  
St. Dev 0.91 0.36 0.50 1.07  
Median 7.33   6.50  
Obs 90 600 70 600  
 
  
Notes: RD= Rejected demands; AR (All) =Acceptance Rate with respect to all offers; AR (Low) 
=Acceptance Rate with respect to low offers (less or equal to 20% of the pie); FAV=Favoured; 
UNF=Unfavoured. 
Figure 2: Histograms – All rounds 
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Table 2: Regression Analysis of Logit model for probability of acceptance – 50% treatment & FRC treatments 
DEP VAR ACCEPT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     CHANCE 5.872*** 6.695*** 
  
 
(1.552) (1.878) 
  FRC_20% 
  
-0.782 -1.438 
   
(0.898) (1.025) 
FRC_1% 
  
-1.735** -1.788* 
   
(0.882) (1.003) 
FRC_0% 
  
-4.114*** -4.819*** 
   
(0.919) (1.068) 
OFFER 3.425*** 3.525*** 3.438*** 3.545*** 
 
(0.214) (0.237) (0.214) (0.238) 
FAVOURED 1.870** 1.666* 1.061 1.173 
 
(0.897) (0.934) (1.062) (1.069) 
ECONOMICS 
 
1.757** 
 
1.858** 
  
(0.786) 
 
(0.765) 
YEAR 
 
-0.0654 
 
-0.0405 
  
(0.203) 
 
(0.196) 
GENDER 
 
1.512** 
 
1.438** 
  
(0.737) 
 
(0.717) 
UK 
 
1.646** 
 
1.559** 
  
(0.752) 
 
(0.726) 
Constant -7.422*** 118.8 -4.751*** 72.50 
 
(0.831) (402.5) (0.779) (388.7) 
ROUND DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,500 2,165 2,500 2,165 
Number of id 189 159 189 159 
Chi2 264.7 227.5 265.8 228.8 
Percentage of correct predicted 
outcomes 81.9% 82.7% 81.7% 82.5% 
Notes: Predicted outcomes are computed from the model predicted probability of acceptance by assigning a predicted outcome 
of acceptance (rejection) whenever the predicted probability is greater (smaller or equal) to 0.5. So a predicted outcome is 
correct when it matches the actual decision of the subject, i.e. when the subject accepted (rejected) an offer and the model 
predicted a probability greater (smaller or equal) than 0.5.  
 
Figure 3: Predicted probability of acceptance according to 
specification (3) of Table 2 
 
 
Table 3: Results of Wald test relative to specification 
(3) of Table 2 
  50% 20% 1% 
20% -0,87   
  (0,898)   
1% -1,97** -0,97  
  (0,882) (0,979)  
0% -4,48*** -3,28*** -2,39** 
  (0,918) (1,016) (0,994) 
Note: The Table reports z-statistics and its 
standard errors relative to Wald tests of Ho: βk-
βl=0 against H₁: βk-βl ≠0, where βk and βl are the 
coefficients of Treatment dummies determined in 
specification 3 of Table 2. Rejections of H₀ at the 
10% / 5% / 1% is denoted by one, two and three 
stars respectively. 
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Table 4: Regression Analysis of proposals –50% treatment & FRC treatments  
DEP VAR DEMAND 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
CHANCE 0.995*** 1.072*** 
  
 
(0.274) (0.341) 
  FRC_20% 
  
0.0384 -0.0937 
   
(0.157) (0.185) 
FRC_1% 
  
-0.298* -0.274 
   
(0.154) (0.190) 
FRC_0% 
  
-0.684*** -0.810*** 
   
(0.159) (0.179) 
UNFAVOURED 0.258* 0.273* 0.0649 0.0910 
 
(0.154) (0.148) (0.165) (0.162) 
ECONOMICS 
 
0.499*** 
 
0.527*** 
  
(0.143) 
 
(0.151) 
YEAR 
 
0.0663 
 
0.0665 
  
(0.0492) 
 
(0.0476) 
GENDER 
 
0.0174 
 
0.0330 
  
(0.132) 
 
(0.128) 
UK 
 
0.152 
 
0.161 
  
(0.140) 
 
(0.140) 
Constant 6.357*** -125.7 6.786*** -125.7 
 
(0.110) (97.74) (0.117) (94.56) 
ROUND DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,380 3,740 4,380 3,740 
Number of id 219 187 219 187 
R2 Between 0.0510 0.143 0.0817 0.174 
R2 Within 0.00855 0.0117 0.00855 0.0117 
R2 Overall 0.0339 0.0906 0.0522 0.110 
  
Table 5: Results of Wald test relative to specification (3) of Table 4. 
FRC DEMANDS ALL ROUNDS 
  50% 20% 1% 
20% 0,03   
  (0,156)   
1% -0.2*** -0.3**  
  (0.154) (0.164)  
0% -0.6*** -0.7*** -0.3** 
  (0.159) (0.172) (0.17) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
Table 6: Regression Analysis of Logit model for probability of acceptance – 50% treatment & VRC treatments 
DEP VAR ACCEPT 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
CHANCE 1.245 2.615* 15.11*** 14.33** 
  
 
(1.199) (1.587) (4.837) (6.787) 
  CHANCE SQUARED 
  
-27.85*** -23.83* 
  
   
(9.391) (13.37) 
  VRC_20% 
    
1.274* 0.691 
     
(0.654) (0.942) 
VRC_1% 
    
0.108 -0.776 
     
(0.654) (0.844) 
VRC_0% 
    
-1.134* -1.589* 
     
(0.657) (0.902) 
OFFER 2.845*** 3.043*** 2.861*** 3.049*** 2.880*** 3.061*** 
 
(0.188) (0.253) (0.188) (0.252) (0.189) (0.253) 
FAVOURED 0.263 0.402 0.0704 0.248 0.0746 0.250 
 
(0.443) (0.659) (0.454) (0.672) (0.454) (0.672) 
ECO 
 
1.365** 
 
1.401** 
 
1.400** 
  
(0.666) 
 
(0.658) 
 
(0.654) 
YEAR 
 
0.368 
 
0.279 
 
0.257 
  
(0.229) 
 
(0.230) 
 
(0.230) 
GENDER 
 
1.301** 
 
1.185* 
 
1.127* 
  
(0.659) 
 
(0.651) 
 
(0.650) 
UK 
 
0.124 
 
0.132 
 
0.160 
  
(0.648) 
 
(0.638) 
 
(0.635) 
Constant -4.839*** -738.8 -5.378*** -561.6 -4.836*** -517.7 
 
(0.662) (454.8) (0.688) (456.7) (0.716) (456.4) 
ROUND DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2380 1610 2380 1610 2380 1610 
N_g 238 161 238 161 238 161 
chi2 236.1 153.1 239.8 154.3 241.3 154.9 
Percentage of correctly 
predicted outcomes 84.2% 85.6% 84.6% 86% 84.3% 85.7% 
Notes: See Table 2 
 
Figure 4: Predicted probability of acceptance according to 
specification (3) of Table 6 
 
Table 7: Results of Wald test relative to specification 
(3) of Table 6 
VRC ACCEPTANCES ALL ROUNDS 
  50% 20% 1% 
20% 1,95*   
  (0,653)   
1% 0,17 -1,7*  
  (0,653) (0,661)  
0% -1,73* -3,56*** -1,86* 
  (0,657) (0,676) (0,669) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 8: Regression Analysis of proposals –50% treatment & VRC treatments 
DEP VAR DEMAND 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
CHANCE 0.277 0.485 4.711*** 3.545** 
  
 
(0.266) (0.345) (1.196) (1.552) 
  CHANCE SQUARED 
  
-8.889*** -6.214** 
  
   
(2.281) (3.073) 
  FRC_20% 
    
0.434*** 0.234 
     
(0.151) (0.215) 
FRC_1% 
    
0.221 0.0676 
     
(0.154) (0.192) 
FRC_0% 
    
-0.415*** -0.523*** 
     
(0.143) (0.177) 
UNFAVOURED -0.264*** -0.137 -0.279*** -0.144 -0.292*** -0.157* 
 
(0.0956) (0.0908) (0.0961) (0.0911) (0.0957) (0.0908) 
ECONOMICS 
 
0.134 
 
0.156 
 
0.162 
  
(0.144) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.145) 
AGE 
 
0.0499 
 
0.0276 
 
0.0111 
  
(0.0597) 
 
(0.0604) 
 
(0.0592) 
GENDER 
 
0.0808 
 
0.0522 
 
0.00372 
  
(0.141) 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.136) 
UK 
 
-0.0641 
 
-0.0622 
 
-0.0453 
  
(0.142) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.134) 
Constant 6.714*** -92.76 6.574*** -48.42 6.710*** -15.40 
 
(0.113) (118.8) (0.119) (120.1) (0.124) (117.7) 
ROUND DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4160 2824 4160 2824 4160 2824 
Number of id 238 161 238 161 238 161 
R2 Between 0.00591 0.0143 0.0330 0.0389 0.0820 0.0911 
R2 Within 0.0381 0.0360 0.0382 0.0360 0.0382 0.0360 
R2 Overall 0.00593 0.0169 0.0289 0.0279 0.0493 0.0499 
 
Table 9: Results of Wald test relative to specification (3) of Table 8 
VRC DEMANDS ALL ROUNDS 
  50% 20% 1% 
20% 0,43***   
  (0,15)   
1% 0,22 -0,21  
  (0,153) (0,174)  
0% -0,41*** -0,84*** -0,63*** 
  (0,142) (0,152) (0,155) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
  
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Responses and Demands per Treatment – Round 1 
 
Table 10a: Eq-Opp. 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7.9 83.9% 77.8% 6,83  
St. Dev 0.82 0.37 0.44 1,15  
Median 7.5   7  
Obs 5 31 9 62  
 
 
 
Table 10b:FRC 20% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7.7 83.9% 57.1% 6,66 7,01 
St. Dev 1.40 0.37 0.53 ,94 1,27 
Median 8   6,5 7 
Obs 5 31 7 31 31 
 
 
Table 10e: VRC 20% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 8.87 73.3% 22.2% 6,77 6,86 
St. Dev 0,74 0.45 .44 1,08 1,55 
Median 9   6,5 6,78 
Obs 8 30 9 30 30 
 
Table 10c:FRC 1% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7,48 81.2% 50% 6,59 6,30 
St. Dev 0,55 0.40 0.58 ,97 1,92 
Median 7,5   6,625 6 
Obs 6 32 4 32 32 
 
Table 10f: VRC 1% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 8,48 85.7% 42.9% 6,98 6,89 
St. Dev 0.41 0.36 53.4 1,07 2,16 
Median 8,46   7 7,09 
Obs 4 28 7 28 28 
 
Table 10d:FRC 0% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7,33 80.6% 66.7% 6,21  
St. Dev 0,98 0.401 0.58 1,19  
Median 7,25    6  
Obs 6 31 3 31  
 
Table 10g: VRC 0% 
 
Responses Demands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RD AR (All) AR (Low) FAV UNF 
Mean 7,64 76.7% 0 6,10  
St. Dev 1,38 0.43  1,37  
Median 7   6  
Obs 7 30 2 30  
 
  
Notes: See Table 1  
Table 11: Regression Analysis of Logit model for probability of acceptance in Round 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DEP VAR: ACCEPT FRC & 50% FRC & 50% VRC & 50% VRC & 50% 
CHANCE 1.952 
 
2.089 
 
 
(1.498) 
 
(1.697) 
 FRC_20% 
 
-0.394 
  
  
(0.828) 
  FRC_1% 
 
-0.785 
  
  
(0.773) 
  FRC_0% 
 
-1.150 
  
  
(0.889) 
  VRC_20% 
   
-0.982 
    
(1.013) 
VRC_1% 
   
0.00710 
    
(0.992) 
VRC_0% 
   
-2.875** 
    
(1.214) 
OFFER 1.121*** 1.123*** 1.637*** 2.083*** 
 
(0.275) (0.280) (0.308) (0.398) 
FAVOURED 0.533 0.395 0.666 1.325 
 
(0.794) (0.870) (0.854) (1.070) 
Constant -2.144** -1.223 -3.360*** -3.170*** 
 
(0.938) (0.831) (0.896) (1.022) 
Observations 125 125 119 119 
Chi2 16.95 17.19 29.90 31.62 
Percentage of correctly predicted 
outcomes 83% 82.4% 87.4% 88.2% 
Notes: See Table 2 
 
Table 12: Results of Wald test relative to specification (2) 
of Table 11 
FRC ACCEPTANCES ROUND 1 
  50% 20% 1% 
20% -0,48   
  (0,828)   
1% -1,01 -0,53  
  (-1,01) (0,743)  
0% -1,29 -0,87 -0,49 
  (0,889) (0,866) (0,743) 
 
Table 13 Results of Wald test relative to specification (4) 
of Table 11 
VRC ACCEPTANCE  ROUND 1 
  50% 20% 1% 
20% -0,97   
  (1,012)   
1% 0,01 1,22  
  (0,992) (0,812)  
0% -2,37** -2,04** -2,98*** 
  (1,213) (0,929) (0,965) 
 
Notes: See Table 3.       Notes: See Table 3. 
  
Table 14: Regression Analysis of Demands for Round 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DEP VAR: DEMAND FRC & 50% FRC& 50% VRC& 50% VRC& 50% 
CHANCE 1.051** 
 
0.556 
 
 
(0.406) 
 
(0.453) 
 FRC_20% 
 
-0.00498 
  
  
(0.225) 
  FRC_1% 
 
-0.401* 
  
  
(0.225) 
  FRC_0% 
 
-0.611** 
  
  
(0.259) 
  VRC_20% 
   
-0.0128 
    
(0.246) 
VRC_1% 
   
0.107 
    
(0.251) 
VRC_0% 
   
-0.731** 
    
(0.289) 
UNFAVOURED 0.165 0.0222 0.248 -0.00397 
 
(0.223) (0.239) (0.265) (0.282) 
Constant 6.373*** 6.830*** 6.563*** 6.830*** 
 
(0.127) (0.147) (0.156) (0.147) 
Observations 219 219 208 208 
R-squared 0.026 0.035 0.009 0.037 
 
Table 15: Results of Wald test relative to specification (2) 
of Table 14 
FRC DEMANDS ROUND 1 
  50% 20% 1% 
20% -0,005   
  (0,224)   
1% -0,4* -0,39*  
  (0,224) (0,238)  
0% -0,61** -0,6** -0,21 
  (0,019) (0,272) (0,272) 
 
Table 16: Results of Wald test relative to specification (4) 
of Table 13 
VRC DEMANDS ROUND 1 
  50% 20% 1% 
20% -0,01   
  (0,245)   
1% 0,11 0,12  
  (0,25) (0,284)  
0% -0,73** -0,71** -0,83*** 
  (0,288) (0,317) (0,321) 
 
Notes: See Table 3.      Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of mean proposals over rounds – FRC and VRC treatments 
  
  
  
6
6.
5
7
7.
5
8
M
e
a
n
 
Pr
o
po
sa
l
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Round
50% 20% _FRC
1% _FRC 0% _FRC
6
6.
5
7
7.
5
8
M
e
a
n
 
Pr
o
po
sa
l
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Round
50% 20% _VRC
1% _VRC 0% _VRC
Table 17: Regression Analysis of Logit model for probability of acceptance – All Treatments 
 DEPENDENTE VARIABLE ACCEPT 
   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
FRC_20% -0.396 
 
-0.150 0.233 
 
(0.689) 
 
(0.786) (1.246) 
FRC_1% -1.492** 
 
-1.685** -2.095 
 
(0.754) 
 
(0.778) (1.282) 
FRC_0% -3.613*** 
 
-2.262*** -5.817*** 
 
(0.778) 
 
(0.826) (1.462) 
VRC_20% 1.315** 
 
1.335* 2.865** 
 
(0.669) 
 
(0.788) (1.244) 
VRC_1% 0.135 
 
0.703 0.941 
 
(0.673) 
 
(0.757) (1.215) 
VRC_0% -1.181* 
 
-1.506** -0.430 
 
(0.673) 
 
(0.752) (1.225) 
OFFER 3.057*** 3.000*** 2.667*** 4.983*** 
 
(0.145) (0.143) (0.309) (0.648) 
FAVOURED 0.243 0.688* -0.0240 0.500 
 
(0.413) (0.400) (0.757) (1.011) 
ROUND 
 
0.0642** 
  
  
(0.0315) 
  FRC TREATMENTS 
 
-1.363** 
  
  
(0.690) 
  VRC TREATMENTS 
 
0.0458 
  
  
(0.674) 
  ROUND_X_FRC 
 
-0.0323 
  
  
(0.0355) 
  ROUND_X_VRC 
 
-0.000420 
  
  
(0.0367) 
  Constant -4.740*** -5.083*** -4.318*** -7.433*** 
 
(0.624) (0.648) (0.808) (1.575) 
ROUND DUMMIES YES  NO YES YES 
Observations 4,260 4,260 1,065 1,065 
chi2 452.7 442.0 75.49 60.66 
Percentage of correctly predicted 
outcomes 83.26% 82.61% 81.78% 85.53% 
Notes: See Table 2 
 
Table 18: Results of Wald test relative to specification (1), Table 17 
 VRC ACCEPTANCE ALL ROUNDS 
   20% 1% 0% 
FR
C 
A
CC
EP
TA
N
CE
 
 
20% -1.71**   
 (0.679)   
1%   -1.63**  
  (0.76)  
0%    -2.43*** 
   (0.773) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
 
 
 Table 19: Results of Wald test relative to specification (3), 
Table 17 
 VRC ACCEPTANCE FIRST 5 ROUNDS 
   20% 1% 0% 
FR
C 
A
CC
EP
TA
N
CE
 
FI
R
ST
 
5 
R
O
U
N
D
S 
 
20% -1.69*   
 (0.930)   
1%   -2.95***  
  (0.847)  
0%    -0.96 
   (0.793) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Table 20: Results of Wald test relative to specification (4), Table 17 
 
 VRC ACCEPTANCE LAST 5 ROUNDS  
   20% 1% 0% 
FR
C 
A
CC
EP
TA
N
CE
 
LA
ST
 
5 
R
O
U
N
D
S 
 
20% -2.11**   
 (1.250)   
1%   -2.26**  
  (1.343)  
0%    - 3.74*** 
   (1.440) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
 
Table 21: Regression Analysis of Demands – All Treatments 
DEP VAR PROPOSAL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
FRC_20% -0.0700 
 
-0.0897 -0.114 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.195) (0.150) 
FRC_1% -0.193 
 
-0.116 -0.259 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.199) (0.159) 
FRC_0% -0.684*** 
 
-0.594*** -0.866*** 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.205) (0.155) 
VRC_20% 0.414*** 
 
0.231 0.410*** 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.176) (0.155) 
VRC_1% 0.223 
 
0.272 0.161 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.179) (0.145) 
VRC_0% -0.415*** 
 
-0.649*** -0.275* 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.188) (0.144) 
ROUND 
 
0.00819 
  
  
(0.00682) 
  FRC TREATMENTS 
 
-0.255 
  
  
(0.165) 
  VRC TREATMENTS 
 
-0.0912 
  
  
(0.161) 
  ROUND_X_FRC 
 
-0.00562 
  
  
(0.00793) 
  ROUND_X_VRC 
 
0.0154* 
  
  
(0.00807) 
  Constant 6.729*** 6.876*** 6.756*** 7.083*** 
  (0.111) (0.137) (0.128) (0.103) 
ROUND DUMMIES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,880 4,880 1,220 1,220 
R-squared 0.108 0.0385 0.0819 0.142 
 
  
Table 22: Results of Wald test relative to specification (1) – Table 21 
 VRC PROPOSALS ALL ROUNDS 
   20% 1% 0% 
FR
C 
PR
O
PO
SA
L 
A
LL
 
R
O
U
N
D
S 
 
20% -2.96***   
 (0.163)   
1%   -2.63***  
  (0.158)  
0%    - 1.67* 
   (0.161) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Table 23: Results of Wald test relative to specification (3), 
Table 21 
 VRC PROPOSAL FIRST 5 ROUNDS 
   20% 1% 0% 
FR
C 
PR
O
PO
SA
L 
FI
R
ST
 
5 
R
O
U
N
D
S 
 20% -1.64   
 (0.195)   
1%   -1.92*  
  (0.202)  
0%    0.25 
   (0.215) 
 
Table 24: Results of Wald test relative to specification 
(4), Table 21 
 VRC PROPOSAL LAST 5 ROUNDS 
   20% 1% 0% 
FR
C 
PR
O
PO
SA
L 
LA
ST
 
5 
R
O
U
N
D
S 
 
20% -3.14***   
 (0.167)   
1%   -2.52 **  
  (0.167)  
0%    -3.67*** 
   (0.161) 
 
Notes: See Table 3.      Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Figure 6: Allocation per Treatments: All rounds and last five rounds 
Panel a: All rounds Panel b: Last five rounds 
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